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ABSTRACT
This Article aims to forward the dialogue about transnational
regulatory governance through a law and geography analysis of climate
change litigation. Part II begins by considering fundamental barriers to
responsible transnational energy production. Part III proposes a placebased approach to dissecting climate change litigation and a model for
understanding its spatial implications. Parts IV through VI map
representative examples of climate change litigation in subnational,
national, and supranational fora. The Article concludes by exploring the
normative implications of this descriptive geography; it engages the
intersection of international law, international relations, and geography as
a jumping-off point for a companion article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2005, Sheila Watt-Cloutier with the support of the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference filed a petition with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights against the United States claiming that its
climate change policy violates the Inuit’s human rights.1 The petition
argues that despite U.S. responsibility for a substantial percentage of the
world’s greenhouse gas emissions, it has failed to develop adequate
policies to limit its emissions.2
The problems that this petition addresses are well documented. The
recently released report of the key findings of the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment details the rapidity and severity of climate change in the

1. See Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States
(submitted Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/reports/ICC_Human_
Rights_Petition.pdf [hereinafter Inuit Petition]; see also Press Release, Earthjustice, Inuit Leader
Sheila Watt-Cloutier Announces Intention to File a Human Rights Claim (Dec. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.earthjustice.org/news/display.html?ID=935.
2. Inuit Petition, supra note 1.
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region;3 average temperature increases, for example, are at almost twice
the global rate.4 The impacts on the Inuit from the environmental changes
include threats to homes from storms and melting permafrost, to livelihood
from changes in animal populations, to life from thinning ice that makes
traditional travel routes more dangerous, and to culture from the
combination of these and other changes with increased navigation through
major marine routes.5
A geography of the actors in this case is dizzying. The Inuit
Circumpolar Conference (ICC) is a regional organization representing
Inuit peoples who live in the Arctic, an area which cross-cuts several
existing national borders.6 The Inuit represented by the ICC have
multiscalar ties to place, ranging from their local communities to regional
and international organizations and governmental bodies. The respondent
is a large nation-state, the United States, but many of the criticized
greenhouse gas emissions emanate from corporations with ties to
particular U.S. states, as well as to several other nation-states. The
adjudicator is the Inter-American Commission, which is a regional body
composed of individuals from several nation-states—partly overlapping
with the Arctic nation-states—acting in a regional capacity. Claims to the
Commission draw from regional human rights law, which this petition
applies to circumstances that connect geographically disparate localities—
the ones in which emissions occur and the ones in which the climate
change impacts are experienced—due to a process that occurs in the
atmosphere around the globe.7
This Article analyzes the Inuit petition and other examples of climate
change litigation from a law and geography perspective, with the aim of
understanding their implications for transnational regulatory governance.8

3. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A WARMING
ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 2004, available at http://www.amap.no/acia/index.
html.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 16–17.
6. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=16&Lang=
En (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The organization holds Consultative Status II at the United Nations.”
Id.
7. For a more in-depth discussion of the actors in the case, see infra Part VI.B.1.
8. This Article is the second in a series exploring characterization issues that occur at
international environmental intersections. The first article, Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from
Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71
(2005), developed a model and applied it to a series of case studies in order to propose a more
systematic approach to international environmental rights advocacy. My observation of the statecorporate regulatory dynamic in those cases provided the inspiration for this Article. After completing
a companion piece that explores the normative implications of the geography of climate change
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This type of litigation provides a particularly interesting example of
adjudication to address energy production’s externalities9 because it
engages multiscalar contributions to a supranational atmospheric process
that causes multiscalar impacts over time. The movement from local to
global to local through various governmental regulatory structures infuses
the relationships among those contributing to and suffering from climate
change with an unusual richness. Moreover, those impacted by climate
change have brought actions in a wide range of judicial fora, which allows
for comparative analysis of tribunals’ approaches to these multilayered
situations.
Although the existing scholarly literature analyzes international
regulation of corporations in general,10 and climate change11 and
environmental rights litigation12 in particular, these discussions focus

litigation, I plan to focus future articles in the series on the intersections of trade and the environment,
natural disaster and the environment, and armed conflict and the environment.
9. This Article focuses predominantly on the externality of climate change and its impacts.
Some of the cases it analyzes, however, focus on other externalities as well. For example, the Nigerian
gas flaring case also engages the health impacts of the toxins being released. See infra note 65.
10. See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 309 (2004) (exploring the role that corporate social responsibility could play in international
regulation of corporations); Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and
International Law: Where from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2003) (considering the inadequacy of
existing international regulatory mechanisms and proposing a new one); Janelle M. Diller, On the
Possibilities and Limitations of NGO Participation in International Law and Its Processes: Corporate
Applications, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 304 (2001) (analyzing the current and potential role of
NGOs in global corporate governance); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.
931 (2004) (exploring direct international-level regulation of transnational corporations); Joel R. Paul,
Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 285 (2001) (introducing a symposium issue on transnational corporate liability).
11. See, e.g., William C.G. Burns, The Exigencies that Drive Potential Causes of Action for
Climate Change Damages at the International Level, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 223 (2004)
(introducing litigative efforts to compel more rigorous greenhouse gas emissions reductions); Richard
W. Thackeray, Jr., Note, Struggling for Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens’ Suits Under the Clean Air
Act, and the United States’ Options for Addressing Global Climate Change, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 855, 884–98 (2004) (describing various citizen suits aimed at forcing changes in U.S. climate
change policy).
12. See, e.g., Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2003) (discussing human rights claims as
proxies for environmental claims under the current Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) jurisprudence);
Linda A. Malone & Scott Pasternack, Exercising Environmental Human Rights and Remedies in the
United Nations System, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 365 (2002) (describing how
environmental rights claims can be filed in the United Nations system); Deborah Schaaf & Julie
Fishel, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:
Victory for Indian Land Rights and the Environment, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 175 (2002) (discussing the
implications of Dann v. United States, Case No. 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 113/01 (2001)); Mariana T.
Acevedo, Student Article, The Intersection of Human Rights and Environmental Protection in the
European Court of Human Rights, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 437 (2000) (considering Guerra and Others v.
Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998) in the context of European Court of Human Rights environmental
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primarily on specific litigative or regulatory approaches as tools for
achieving corporate responsibility.13 To the extent that state sovereignty
and authority are analyzed in the context of multinational corporate
responsibility, pieces tend to debate their limitations in light of the growth
of non-state-based actors and regulatory mechanisms.14
This piece builds upon that literature by arguing that climate change
litigation represents a modified Westphalian15 geography, in which the
nation-state still plays a core role but must navigate a three-dimensional
spatial terrain. An analysis of individual subnational, national, and
supranational cases provides a nuanced demonstration of the multiscalar
places and spaces16 that this geography entails,17 and provides a basis for

rights jurisprudence); Jennifer A. Amiott, Note, Environment, Equality, and Indigenous Peoples’ Land
Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 32 ENVTL. L. 873 (2002) (providing an overview of The Mayagna (Sumo)
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Case No. 79, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Ser. C (2001)). For broader
overviews of the intersection of human rights and the environment, see RUCHI ANAND,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION (2004) (exploring the
environmental justice implications of international environmental problems); HUMAN RIGHTS & THE
ENVIRONMENT (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2002) (exploring cases studies that represent conflicts at the
intersection of human rights and the environment); HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996) (exploring the extent to which human
rights law can help forward environmental protection); LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003) (exploring various issues at the
intersection of human rights and the environment).
13. See sources cited supra notes 10–12.
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra note 27 and accompanying text. For further
law and geography perspectives, see sources cited infra note 40.
15. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
16. These terms are used in a variety of contexts in the scholarly literature, often with variant
meanings as their core focus. Compare DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL
GEOGRAPHY 369 (2001) (using conceptions of space to engage movement of capital as part of a
Marxist critique) with Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial
Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONTRACT
81, 107 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) (providing a discussion of the spatial
structure of the international economy that includes financial and business networks, as well as legal
structures). For a thoughtful analysis of the need to reengage the concept of space in our globalizing
world, see DOREEN MASSEY, FOR SPACE (2005). In this piece, I am primarily focused on legal spaces,
although I acknowledge the broader spatial context in which legal spaces evolve:
Our legal lives are constituted by shifting intersections of different and not necessarily
coherently articulating legal orders associated with different scalar spaces. The relations
between these different legal spaces is a dynamic and complex one, but it is a pressing and
important subject of inquiry given the ways in which the codes operative at various scales
intermingle.
David Delaney, Richard T. Ford & Nicholas Blomley, Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL
GEOGRAPHIES READER xiii, xxi (Nicholas Blomley, David Delany & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001). To
that end, in this Article, I am using “place” to connote ties to particular geographic locations, “scale”
to engage the applicable level of governance (e.g., subnational, national, supranational), and “space” to
describe socio-political and legal structures.
17. Some scholars have argued that geographic ties are becoming less important in the face of
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further reflections on transnational regulatory governance. This Article’s
approach is thus primarily descriptive, but its final parts introduce a
normative inquiry that will form the basis for a future companion article.
Part II begins by exploring the foundational challenges to effective
regulation of the energy industry’s externalities. Part III proposes a placebased approach to dissecting climate change litigation and a model for
understanding its spatial implications. Parts IV through VI apply this
model to specific case examples of litigation regarding global climate
change occurring in subnational, national, and supranational regional and
international fora. Part VII begins an engagement of the normative
implications of this terrain, situating it at the intersection of international
law, international relations, and geography. The Article concludes by
arguing that effective transnational regulation requires an engagement of
this geography and suggesting next steps for this inquiry.
II. CHALLENGES TO RESPONSIBLE TRANSNATIONAL ENERGY
PRODUCTION
The vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions are caused by energyrelated activities.18 This Part provides the context in which climate change
litigation is occurring by exploring foundational challenges to responsible
transnational energy production. First, the structure of the energy
production process reinforces the creation of numerous social and
environmental externalities. Second, the corporations which produce and
use the energy have an uncertain status in the international legal system.
Finally, the multiscalar nature of the industry creates overlapping
regulatory authority.

globalization. In the context of international environmental law, for example, Christopher Stone has
made this argument. See Christopher D. Stone, Locale and Legitimacy in International Environmental
Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1279 (1996). The nuances of that theoretical debate are beyond the scope of
this Article, which focuses on demonstrating the value of a law and geography approach through
applying it to the example of climate change. I am in the process of developing a broader piece with
Alexander Murphy that makes an argument for why international law needs geography and engages
this literature more directly.
18. “As the largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 from fossil fuel combustion
has accounted for nearly 80 percent of GWP weighted emissions since 1990.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA 430-R-05-003, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–
2003 ES-6 (2005).
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A. Nature of the Transnational Energy Production Process
The first challenge stems from the nature of the energy production
process, which has multiscalar ties to place. Energy resources are extracted
from a particular locality by corporate entities that may represent multiple
nationalities, under the supervision of subnational and national regulatory
agencies.19
This structure provides for complex interactions among entities that
occupy variant and overlapping geopolitical spaces. Corporations wield
economic clout, each level of government relies upon its sovereign
regulatory authority, and the impacted populations assert legal rights and
grassroots political influence. These power relationships produce
problematic
patterns:
Governments
chronically
underenforce
environmental standards, and the structure of resource extraction often
enmeshes corporations with armed conflict or with dictatorial regimes that
commit human rights violations.20
Moreover, the foundational structural complexities are reinforced by
the socioeconomic realities of the modern energy industry. The supply of
nonrenewable energy sources continues to drop,21 the production process
and usage of the final products result in significant environmental and

19. See Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and
International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 331 (2004).
20. For analyses of these issues in various disciplines, see, for example, ECOLOGICAL
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS: THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF RADICAL AND POPULAR
ENVIRONMENTALISM (Bron Raymond Taylor ed., 1995) (providing an interdisciplinary analysis of
global grassroots resistance to environmental degradation); MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS:
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001) (providing a political analysis of the relationship
between resource scarcity and military conflict); Dufresne, supra note 19 (providing a legal analysis of
the relationship between oil exploitation and internal armed conflict); Rebecca Hardin, Concessionary
Politics in the Congo River Basin: History and Culture in Forest Use (World Res. Inst. Working Paper
No. 6, 2002) (providing an anthropological analysis of the role that concessionary politics plays in land
use that includes a discussion of struggles over mineral wealth).
21. The news continues to report new record prices. See, e.g., Perils at the Pump, THE
ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA, Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=4268274&fsrc=nwl (describing the implications of rising prices). For a summary of the range
of perspectives on when the world oil production will peak, see Robert L. Hirsch, Roger Bezdek &
Robert Wendling, Mitigating a Long-Term Shortfall of Oil Production, WORLD OIL MAG., May 2005,
available at http://www.worldoil.com/Magazine/MAGAZINE_DETAIL.asp?ART_ID=2594. A U.S.
Energy Information Administration presentation, in an analysis it terms as relatively optimistic,
predicts that world oil production will peak between 2021 and 2112. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LONG
TERM WORLD OIL SUPPLY (2000), http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/presentations/
2000/long_term_supply/sld001.htm; see also John H. Wood, Gary R. Long & David F. Morehouse,
Long Term World Oil Supply Scenarios: The Future is Neither as Bleak or Rosy as Some Assert
(Aug. 18, 2004), http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/feature_articles/2004/worldoilsupply/
oilsupply04.html (a more recent article by the same authors); cf. KLARE, supra note 20 (examining the
relationship between resource scarcity and military conflict).
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societal externalities,22 and the burdens and benefits of the industry are
inequitably divided.23 Each of these issues sows the seeds for conflict not
only among the key actors in a particular venture, but also among the
many entities that intersect with the energy production process globally.24
As the above description illustrates, the state-corporate regulatory
relationship infuses each of these dilemmas. Because corporations directly
extract and process the raw materials to produce energy, many of the
externalities result directly from their choices. Corporations operate under
the auspices of nation-state and sub-state governments, however, and as a
result, regulatory failures also play a crucial role in conflicts and in
resulting environmental degradation, including greenhouse gas emissions.
B. Corporations in the International Legal System
These energy-specific challenges occur against a backdrop of broader
uncertainty over what space corporations should occupy in the
international system, which poses a second barrier to fostering corporate
responsibility in the energy sector. In a formal legal analysis, states appear
to be the dominant actors in the international system. The processes of
both treaty and customary international law creation rest on the consent of

22. Numerous books and articles have detailed the environmental and human toll of the energy
production process. See, e.g., IKE OKONTA & ORONTO DOUGLAS, WHERE VULTURES FEAST: SHELL,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA (2001) (detailing the environmental and human
consequences of Shell’s oil extraction); Richard L. Ottinger, Energy and Environmental Challenges
for Developed and Developing Countries, 9 PACE ENVT. L. REV. 55, 62–70 (1991) (exploring the
unsustainability and environmental costs of energy supply strategies); Andrea Wang, China’s Energy
Policy and Competing International Environmental Pressures, 2000 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 271, 273–75 (discussing the implications of China’s dependence on coal); Douglas John
Steding, Comment, Russian Floating Nuclear Reactors: Lacunae in Current International
Environmental and Maritime Law and the Need for Proactive International Cooperation in the
Development of Sustainable Energy Sources, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 711, 718–21 (2004)
(discussing environmental and safety concerns posed by Russia’s proposed deployment of floating
nuclear reactors); Monti Aguirre, “The Chixoy Dam Destroyed Our Lives,” HUM. RTS. DIALOGUE,
Spring 2004, at 20 (discussing the flooding of villages due to construction of the Chixoy dam and
human rights violations against protesters).
23. See sources cited supra note 22; see also Dufresne, supra note 19, at 348–63 (analyzing the
way in which state sovereignty over natural resources results in petroleum corporations having rights
in opposition to the population); Judith Kimerling, International Standards in Ecuador’s Amazon Oil
Fields: The Privatization of Environmental Law, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 294–314 (2001)
(discussing environmental impacts and inequity towards indigenous peoples in Ecuador’s Amazon oil
fields); Stephen J. Kobrin, Oil and Politics: Talisman Energy and Sudan, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
425 (2004) (describing the relationship between Talisman Energy and the human rights violations in
Sudan, and the impacts of that relationship).
24. See KLARE, supra note 20 (describing the resultant resource wars); Dufresne, supra note 19
(describing the ensuing internal conflicts).
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sovereign states.25 The very existence of corporations—and the ability to
bind them—similarly emanates from state (and sometimes sub-state)
authority.26
This simple model revolving around the nation-state is challenged by
numerous conceptual approaches that acknowledge the complex relational
structures that underlie the transnational legal system.27 Whatever
theoretical version one chooses, the political and financial clout of nonstate actors and their interactions with governmental actors complicate the
regulatory picture.28 Corporations often have immense resources—Shell
Oil, for example, despite its failures in finding new oil fields, had a record

25. For an overview of state sovereignty and its role in the international legal system, see IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289–99 (5th ed. 1998); see also THE FLUID
STATE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Hilary Charlesworth et al. eds., 2005)
(exploring the contours of the relationships among domestic and international legal systems); Becky
Mansfield, Beyond Rescaling: Reintegrating the ‘National’ as a Dimension of Scalar Relations, 29
PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 458 (2005) (arguing for the importance of engaging the role of the
national); Murphy, supra note 16 (placing state sovereignty’s current status in historical context);
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1318–19 (1996) (exploring intellectual property legal
developments within evolving conceptions of state sovereignty); Antonio F. Perez, Review Essay,
Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 463 (1996) (providing an analysis of how the Westphalian model of state sovereignty has
evolved). I have previously analyzed the role of varying sovereignty regimes in the regulation of
international environmental justice problems. See Osofsky, supra note 8, at 80–86.
26. For an analysis of the multiscalar architecture of U.S. corporate law, see Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation, 2 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 167 (2005).
27. Numerous theories exist to explain why states behave as they do, and whether their
compliance with international norms should be regarded as evidence of international law as law. Some
of the major approaches include transnational legal process, see, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996), transgovernmental network theory, see,
e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and
Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 (2003); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2002), cosmopolitanism, see, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002) (explicating this theory in the context of transnational jurisdiction),
compliance-based approaches to international law, see, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional
Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679 (2003), and state socialization, see, e.g., Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and
Normative Challenges, 54 DUKE L.J. 983 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence
States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). For a recently
proposed integrated theory of the impact of international treaties on state behavior, see Oona A.
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 CHI. L. REV.
469 (2005). For an overview of norm-based and interest-based theories, see OONA ANNE HATHAWAY
& HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2005)
(summarizing these different theories).
28. See Deva, supra note 10 (exploring the limits of current regulatory regimes).

55608-text.native.11581863009/13/2006

2005]

THE GEOGRAPHY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION

1799

2004 net income of $18.5 billion29—that allow them substantial influence
over the process of law creation.30 Nongovernmental organizations’
involvement in norm creation and the resulting accountability concerns
also have been well-documented.31 As a result of the disconnect between
non-state actors’ formal roles and actual level of involvement, substantial
debate has occurred over basic questions, such as: (1) What obligations do
corporations actually have under international law? (2) What mechanisms
exist to create compliance with those obligations? (3) How effective are
those mechanisms and how could they be made more effective?32
In the context of fostering more environmentally and socially
responsible behavior by energy corporations, these questions are
complicated by the relational axes detailed in Part III.B.33 Although a
consensus has emerged, for example, that corporations have direct
obligations to avoid engaging in a limited set of human rights violations,
questions—especially at the margin—of when their involvement with a
governmental violator is sufficient to trigger liability or whether
environmental harm reaches the level of a human rights obligation have

29. Mathew Carr, Shell Cuts Oil and Gas Reserves for Fifth Time (Feb. 3, 2005), http://quote.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=a4aFPhwVLAbY#.
30. For a discussion of the relationship between corporations and the international legal system,
see sources cited supra note 10; see also TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL FRAMEWORK (A.A. Fatouros ed., 1994); TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL
LAW (Seymour J. Rubin & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 1994).
31. For assessment of the important role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play in a
range of international law contexts and how that role might evolve, see Steve Charnovitz,
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 331 (1996) (arguing that NGOs can play a constructive role in both policymaking and
dispute resolution in the World Trade Organization); Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental
Organizations in the Climate Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 115 (1998)
(describing the diverse involvement of NGOs in international law and policy); Stephan Hobe, Global
Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997) (surveying the role of NGOs in the international community);
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611 (1994) (analyzing the participation of NGOs in the proceedings of
international tribunals); Patricia Waak, Shaping a Sustainable Planet: The Role of Nongovernmental
Organizations, 6 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345 (1995) (exploring the role of NGOs in
international environmental and development law and policy). Some scholars have raised concerns
about the accountability gap as nongovernmental organizations gain power. See, e.g., Robert Charles
Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case
for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261 (2004) (arguing for greater formal regulation of
NGOs); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the
“Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996) (raising accountability concerns with
NGOs).
32. The books and articles on corporations and nongovernmental organizations cited supra notes
10, 30 and 31 explore each of these three questions, which I posed to participants when chairing the
panel Corporate Compliance with International Law at International Law Weekend–West 2005.
33. See infra Part III.B.
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been more controversial.34 Similarly, because the home and host countries
both have regulatory claims regarding transnational energy production,
issues arise about which judicial forum and governmental regulators
would be most appropriate and effective for achieving compliance.35 A
clear understanding of the state-corporate dynamic in each situation is thus
critical to addressing and preventing the problematic behavior.
C. Overlapping Regulatory Regimes
The above-described dilemma of how to locate corporations is
compounded by a third challenge, that of addressing the appropriate level
at which to regulate them. In the law and economics arena, for example,
scholars and policymakers have debated the extent to which the federal
government, as opposed to state governments, should be involved in U.S.
environmental regulation. Substantial disagreements exist over when
market failures occur, what causes them, how environmental harms might
be integrated into the cost of production, and what entity should serve as
the primary regulator. Both theoretical and empirical accounts have
invoked conceptual approaches, such as public choice theory, to argue for
radically different outcomes.36

34. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (summarizing the jurisprudence on direct corporate liability and corporate aiding and abetting
liability). The opinion, and more specifically the holdings regarding corporate liability, recently
survived a renewed motion to dismiss based on the new developments in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004), and Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), motion to certify
appeal denied by 2005 WL 2082847 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005).
35. These issues are explored in the sources cited supra notes 22 and 23.
36. In the mid-1990s, the debate over the appropriate governmental level at which to regulate
focused on whether state or federal environmental regulation was more likely to lead to a race to the
bottom, but it often contained arguments based on public choice theory. Compare Kristen H. Engel,
State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 271 (1997) (arguing for the value of federal environmental regulation), Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (same), Joshua D. Sarnoff, The
Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection,
7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997) (same), and Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race
to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996) (same), with Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV & YALE J. ON REG. 23 (1996) (arguing against extensive federal environmental regulation);
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom”
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 7 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (same); Richard L.
Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82
MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (same); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (same). More recently, the focus has shifted from race to
the bottom arguments to public choice ones. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
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Resolving either that controversy or the value of public choice theory
more generally is beyond the scope of this article. An extension of the
regulatory debate to the context of the transnational energy industry,
however, provides an illustration of the complexities involved. Depending
on whether the home or host state was the more appropriate regulator and
on the particularities of that state, public choice analyses might dictate a
different model of governmental involvement. The background politics;
structure of executive, legislative, and judicial power; and types of active
non-state actors all impact the internal politics of influence.
Recent literature on environmental regulation has already begun to
explore these issues of overlapping regulatory spaces in the broader
transnational environmental context. For example, William Buzbee has
considered the role of spatial mismatches in over- and under-regulation of
environmental externalities.37 Daniel Esty has engaged related issues by
analyzing the way in which emerging technologies create regulatory gaps
that require new institutional responses.38 Climate change litigation fits
into this dialogue by manifesting multiscalar, multispatial regulatory
dilemmas.
The relationship between state and corporate power manifested in this
litigation thus represents a complex geography. The structures of the
energy industry and of the transnational regulatory process provide crucial
obstacles to addressing problems of corporate responsibility. The Parts
that follow propose a strategy for mapping these relationships and then
explore the implications of such a map in the context of efforts to address
energy’s externalities in judicial and quasi-judicial fora.

Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555–57 (2001). Public choice analysis
has also been considered in the international law-making context. For examples of recent scholarship
in this area, see Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition, 90
GEO. L.J. 971 (2002) (exploring the implications of public choice theory for international cooperation);
John K. Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 715 (2005)
(comparing iterative and public choice perspectives on whether leaders will choose to rely upon
treaties or customary international law, and concluding that the iterative perspective is more
persuasive).
37. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003) (exploring what he terms the “regulatory commons problem”). Outside of
this specific law and economics environmental federalism context, numerous other scholars have
explored geographic issues in transnational and international law. See sources cited infra note 42.
38. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115
(2004).
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III. LOCATING PLACE AND SPACE IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
A web of place-based relationships lies at the core of the above
account. The actors involved in transnational energy production—from
states to corporations to nongovernmental organizations to individuals—
identify themselves with at least one bounded geographic entity. The
externalities of the production process, such as localized pollution or
climate change, involve specific impacts in particular places.
An examination of adjudication regarding these externalities reveals
ties between the spaces that structure the cases and specific places. The
choice of parties, fora, and substantive law each connect the case or
petition to particular localities. Such decisions are rarely neutral, but rather
reflect comparative assessments of litigative potential that are tied to
place. For example, whether comparisons occur at a subnational, national,
or supranational level, some places are perceived as having stronger
regulations, more will to enforce their regulations, or a more progressive
judiciary than others.39
Furthermore, the process of litigation creates constrained spaces.
Individuals and entities are defined as inside or outside of the categories of
petitioner, respondent, and adjudicator. Judicial interpretation locates the
boundaries of legislatively created statutes and of administrative
regulations. These categories mold the power relationships occurring
within the confines of a case.

39. Conflicts of law has a substantial literature on forum shopping issues. See, e.g., Zohar Efroni,
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy: New
Opportunities for International Forum Shopping?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 335 (2003) (exploring
forum shopping issues in cyberspace); Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral
Hazard in Forum Shopping, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2004) (arguing that conflicts law
provides a “spontaneous order” that helps to address “the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
inherent in forum shopping”); Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International
Forum Shopping, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463 (2002) (introducing the forum shopping issues discussed in
the symposium). Scholars also have debated how these differences affect commercial decisionmaking.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 36; see also, e.g., Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top? International
Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 347 (1999)
(analyzing the regulation of labor practices); Gary S. Guzy, Reconciling Environmentalist and Industry
Differences: The New Corporate Citizenship “Race to the Top”?, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 409
(2002) (arguing that an environmental convergence is occurring); Tamara L. Joseph, The Debate over
Environmental Standards in the European Community: A Race to the Top Rather than a Race to the
Bottom?, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 161 (1997) (arguing that competitiveness concerns have pushed
standards up in the European Community); John T. Suttles, Jr., Transmigration of Hazardous Industry:
The Global Race to the Bottom, Environmental Justice, and the Asbestos Industry, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
1 (2002) (exploring international environmental justice issues raised by the asbestos industry).
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This Part draws from the discipline of geography40 to present a model
for unpacking the relationships that drive and limit transnational litigation
to achieve socially and environmentally sound approaches to energy
production. It argues that mapping adjudicative efforts to force corporate
responsibility helps to unravel the complex layers of intertwinement
described in Part II. A place-based analysis of actors and claims serves as
a crucial tool for revealing the underlying power dynamics in these
cases.41 It demonstrates a modified Westphalian geography in which states
must navigate overlapping sets of relationships in order to regulate
effectively.42

40. One of the relevant focuses of the geography literature is on the evolving interrelationship of
place, space, and scale. This piece draws from concepts imbedded in both critical human geography
and political geography, and particularly focuses on the dynamic between place and space in climate
change litigation. For an introduction to critical human geography, see DEREK GREGORY,
GEOGRAPHIC IMAGINATIONS (1994) (exploring issues of socialization and deep space); HARVEY,
supra note 16 (providing a series of essays in critical geography developed over a period of years);
EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHICS: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL
THEORY (1993) (engaging the critical spatial perspective on social theory and analysis in a series of
essays). For an introduction to political geography, see A COMPANION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
(John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell & Gerard Toal eds., 2003); JOHN AGNEW, MAKING POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY (2002); KEVIN R. COX, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY: TERRITORY, STATE, AND SOCIETY
(2002) (providing an overview of political geography); MARTIN IRA GLASSNER & CHUCK FAHRER,
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY (3d ed. 2004); see also JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD
POLITICS (2d ed. 2003) (providing an overview of geopolitics); SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS
OF THE WORLD SYSTEM (2003) (same); KLAUS DODDS, GEOPOLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD (2000)
(same).
41. For an example of such an analysis, see NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW , SPACE, AND THE
GEOGRAPHICS OF POWER 189–222 (1994) (comparing a mine closure in the town of Kimberley,
British Columbia, with Re Mia and Medical Services Commission of British Columbia, [1985] 17
D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Can.) and Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1988] 30
B.C.L.R.2d 1 (B.C. Ct. App.)).
42. For accounts of the intersection between law and geography, see generally Delaney, Ford &
Blomley, supra note 16 (providing numerous perspectives on the intersection); BLOMLEY, supra note
41 (mapping the intersection between law and geography); LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane Holder &
Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003) (engaging numerous intersections of law and geography through a series
of essays). For geographic perspectives on various legal issues, see, for example, GEOGRAPHY,
ENVIRONMENT, AND AMERICAN LAW (Gary L. Thompson, Fred M. Shelley & Chand Wije eds., 1997)
(discussing how geography and environmental law influence one another in the U.S. context); RACE,
SPACE, AND THE LAW : UNMAPPING A WHITE SETTLER SOCIETY (Sherene H. Razack ed., 2002)
(exploring the relationships among place, race, and spatial and legal practices); OLEN PAUL
MATTHEWS, WATER RESOURCES, GEOGRAPHY & LAW (1984) (engaging the relationship between
geography and water resources law); Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the “Third
World” in International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000) (exploring how
legal scholars have drawn from political geography and international law critiques of development to
analyze race); Matthew R. Auer, Geography, Domestic Politics and Environmental Diplomacy: A
Case from the Baltic Sea Region, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 77 (1998) (arguing that geography
influences international environmental negotiation through its role in shaping domestic environmental
regulatory institutions); Berman, supra note 27 (presenting a cosmopolitan perspective on
transnational jurisdiction); Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L.
REV. 843 (1999) (providing a geographic analysis of territorial jurisdiction); Jerry Frug, The

55608-text.native.11581863009/13/2006

1804

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1789

A. Connections to Place
This Part explores the potential value of mapping ties to place in
climate change litigation. For each type of actor and component of claims,
this analysis provides insights into the underlying spatial categories and
how they relate to one another.
1. Geography of Actors
A map of the key actors in litigation to address energy’s externalities
reaches beyond a simple discussion of petitioners and respondents. As the
deconstruction of individual cases in Parts IV though VI reveals, the
structure of litigation requires characterizing similar facts in varying ways
to fit applicable laws. Each action focuses on a very narrow account of the
problem that includes a specific configuration of relevant parties. For
instance, one of the national-level cases addressing the externality of
climate change in the United States focuses on the U.S. EPA’s regulatory
authority under the Clean Air Act,43 while another case directly engages
corporate pollution as a public nuisance.44
By explicitly acknowledging each relevant actor’s relationship to place,
this aspect of the inquiry provides a mechanism for understanding the
broader context in which adjudication occurs and, in so doing, escapes the
structural confines of litigation. This type of understanding is particularly
critical in the context of the generation of transnational environmental
problems like climate change that represent nontraditional variations on
cross-boundary pollution.45 A geographic understanding of each actor
reveals a fuller narrative of the case that exposes boundaries and strategic

Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996) (arguing that urban policy at multiple levels
of U.S. government promotes metropolitan fragmentation); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice,
73 FORDAM L. REV. 2501 (2005) (exploring conceptions of spatiality in international and U.S. law, and
its implications for Guantanamo detainees); Robert R.M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping
Local Geography in American and European Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739 (1999)
(applying critical space theory to transborder waste transportation and judicial standing in the United
States and European Union).
43. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S.
Dist. Col. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120).
44. See Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
No. 04 Civ. 5669, available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2004/04-076.pdf.
45. Traditional cross-boundary pollution continues to pose significant legal challenges. For an
analysis of the latest variation on the Trail Smelter dispute, see Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Deja
Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law and the Search for Solutions to CanadianU.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363 (2005).
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choices. Through this account, the power dynamics infusing the litigation
emerge.
a. Petitioners
The mapping of actors begins with an analysis of those initiating the
litigative dialogue in most of the case studies: the petitioners who claim to
be impacted by the externalities.46 Some cases contain an apparently
straightforward geography of those harmed, by providing a tale of tangible
injury in a specific locality. In the situation described in the Introduction,
the physical manifestations of climate change in the Artic have translated
into particular impacts on the Inuit. For example, thinning ice makes
traditional travel routes more dangerous, and the ongoing changes in
animal populations constrains their hunting. The Inuit thus can link the
global phenomenon of climate change to localized claims about their lives,
livelihoods, and traditional cultural practices.47
These individual geographies form a complex web. The scope of global
climate change means that many parties have a wide range of claims, as
represented in the diversity of petitioners in the litigation discussed in
Parts IV through VI. A variety of non-state and governmental actors, each
based in a particular place, argue that they have both standing and a
substantive basis to challenge greenhouse gas emissions.48 Any given
group of petitioners represents a particular subset of those who suffer
similar types of harm, and often a variation on their narrative could be
retold in a different geographic context; for instance, low-lying island
states could make parallel claims to those made by the Inuit.49

46. In general, the petitioners are the ones claiming injury from the externalities. One of the
subnational cases involves the energy producers as the petitioners, however. In re Quantification of
Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
47. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
48. See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35
ENVTL. L. 1 (2005) (exploring standing issues with respect to climate change litigation under federal
environmental statutes). The organization Climate Justice provides a summary of pending climate
change litigation on its website. See Climate Justice, Cases, http://www.climatelaw.org/cases (last
visited Feb. 27, 2006).
49. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 843–76 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/
wg2/pdf/wg2TARchap17.pdf.
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b. Respondents
A map of the entities involved in the production process, some of
whom serve as respondents in adjudication over externalities,50 provides a
converse image. A particular corporation generally extracts the natural
resources and processes them into an energy source. That corporation is
located in its place of incorporation, and to some extent, in every locale in
which it operates.51 Because of the distribution of natural resources around
the globe, often extraction occurs in a developing country52 through a
partnership between a subsidiary of a multinational corporation and other
local entities.53
The entities that regulate corporate behavior—from traditional
governmental regulatory agencies to those involved in funding the exportimport process that allows the flow of goods and capital—are each located
in a particular place, and have relationships that extend into other places
that provide contrasting socioeconomic and political contexts. They serve
as petitioners pushing for greater regulation in some contexts and
respondents fighting these efforts to force regulation in others, and
regulatory entities at different levels of governance occasionally oppose
one another in a lawsuit.54 For instance, cities are among the petitioners in

50. In one case example, however, the corporations were in the role of petitioners. See supra note
46 and accompanying text.
51. For a discussion of international regulation of transnational corporations, see
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 30
(providing an overview of international legal efforts to regulate corporations); TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL LAW, supra note 30 (providing an overview of national law efforts to
regulate corporations); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
52. The term “developing country” is used as a short-hand in this Article for countries with fewer
economic resources that tend to have more nascent or unstable political structures. In the energy
production process, there is often a large socioeconomic and political contrast between the parent
corporation’s home country and the country in which extraction is occurring. More generally,
however, a spectrum of development exists, and countries with very different histories and situations
become lumped together by the terms “developed” and “developing.” The boundaries, moreover, are
difficult to discern. Although I use the terms “developing country” and “developed country”
throughout this paper, I thus acknowledge their limitations.
53. A legal picture of the relationship among the various entities involved in the partnership can
become very complex. For example, depending on the relationship between the parent or subsidiary
and the various governments involved, difficult sovereign immunity questions may arise. See Melissa
Lang & Richard Bales, The Immunity of Foreign Subsidiaries Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 353 (2004) (arguing for the appropriateness of a
beneficial interest test in this context).
54. I discuss them in this category for convenience, and do not intend to imply that they are
always in the role of respondents.
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a U.S. suit against federal-level governmental entities providing assistance
to overseas ventures.55
As in the context of corporate actors, the divide between developed and
developing countries becomes relevant to mapping of governmental
bodies. For example, an entity providing political risk insurance may be
based in a developed country but funding ventures based in a developing
country.56 Moreover, distinctions between levels and branches of
government abound, as represented in the wide range of regulators
described in the cases of Part IV through Part VI.57
c. Adjudicators
The geography of the entity adjudicating also serves as part of the
litigation’s dynamics. Choices among fora almost always exist in the
context of transnational energy production due to the above-described
structure of the industry. The transnational and multiscalar dimensions of
energy production result in substantial ambiguity about which forum is
most appropriate.
Strategic forum selection reflects a cyclical process. Potential
petitioners weigh the various characteristics of particular fora, but their
decision-making is constrained by the options themselves. The
amenability of a particular forum reflects a variety of geopolitical and
socioeconomic factors beyond the control of the parties.58 The decision
does not occur in an idealized Rawlsian world,59 but rather mirrors the
factors shaping the fora.
Moreover, even in fora that reflect international standards for judicial
independence and the rule of law, the adjudicators are still human beings.
Their perspectives and instincts have been honed by their life experiences,
which reflect their geography, broadly construed. Who they are is

55. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2002), available at http://www.
climatelawsuit.org/documents/Complaint_2Amended_Declr_Inj_Relief.pdf.
56. This is the scenario in the German case against Euler Hermes AG. For a description of the
case, see Climate Justice, German Government Sued Over Climate Change, http://www.
climatelaw.org/media/german.suit (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
57. See supra Part IV.
58. The attempts to address the disaster at Bhopal exemplify these dilemmas. For an analysis of
the geopolitical and socioeconomic forces making legal redress difficult in its aftermath, see JAMIE
CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW : LESSONS FROM BHOPAL (1993).
59. John Rawls proposed that a person structuring the social order should operate from behind a
veil of ignorance that prevents knowledge of future social status. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
118–23 (rev. ed. 1999). Not only would such a veil be difficult to construct in our society, but those
ordering society almost always do so from a privileged position.
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inescapably intertwined with their place in the world, which includes not
simply the localities with which they have had significant contact, but also
their socioeconomic, political, and educational experiences. Even when
judges are consciously acting as neutral adjudicators, they cannot fully
divorce themselves from their individually constituted values and
approaches to reasoning.60
A place-based approach assists in an analysis of the particular
regulatory role an adjudicator has been asked to play with respect to the
petitioners and respondents. As described above, petitioners and
respondents vary widely in litigation addressing the externalities of energy
production. In the climate change cases which serve as the focus for this
Article, governmental and nongovernmental entities serve on both sides of
the relevant cases and reflect various levels of the regulatory process.
Because the fora range from the subnational to the supranational, the
dynamic between the adjudicator and the parties varies not only based on
the changing structure of the parties, but also based on the changing
structure of the fora.
2. Geography of Claims
The geography of claims in these lawsuits similarly goes beyond a
detailing of legal arguments. The underlying facts and the application of
law to those facts have their own connections to place that inform a
deconstruction of power dynamics. For example, in the Victoria, Australia,
subnational action involving the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station, the
relevant facts involved localized coal burning contributing to a global
phenomenon—climate change—which in turn has a multiplicity of local
effects around the world.61 The lawsuit successfully relied upon state and
national legislation to challenge limitations on the scope of a stateappointed panel inquiry into environmental effects occurring under those
laws. A place-based analysis of the claims in this lawsuit, as detailed

60. Several schools of thought, such as legal realism, have explored the impact of this
subjectivity. The extent to which socioeconomic context and the qualities of the individual adjudicator
matter remains controversial. For a historical discussion of the legal realism movement, see LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960 (1986). For examples of more recent scholarly
analysis of legal realism, see Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005); New Legal Realism Symposium, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335.
61. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict. Civ. &
Admin. Trib. 2004).
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further in Part IV.B.2,62 helps to unpack the subnational, national, and
supranational elements of the situation and the relationships among them.
Through a focus on the ties to place underlying the factual and legal
claims in climate change lawsuits and petitions, this part of the inquiry
allows for a more nuanced understanding of the litigation’s substance. As
the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station situation exemplifies, facts and
legal claims may map somewhat differently from one another and from
key actors. An exploration of those differences reveals not only issues of
characterization, but also structures of power that shape these struggles
over energy production’s externalities.
a. Facts
A map of claims begins with the facts that underlie them. In any case,
the legal claims only exist because of events that have occurred and may
be continuing to occur. The facts become relevant to a geographic
analysis, however, because of the dynamic between place and space that
drives the interconnection between law and fact. Place does not simply
determine whether a tribunal has and should accept jurisdiction, but also
constrains which legal claims can be made. For example, the facts must be
tied to the United States in particular ways for U.S. federal environmental
law to apply,63 or to the City of Latrobe in Victoria, Australia, for relevant
local, state, and national laws to be at issue in a claim.64
The above-described place-based analysis of key actors begins the
process of mapping facts, as many of the facts relate directly to petitioners
and respondents. But the geography of the facts may be more extensive
than the description of the actors provides. For example, a recently filed
case in the High Court of Nigeria alleges that gas flaring by oil companies
violates constitutional rights and environmental law.65 The plaintiffs in this
lawsuit not only live near the flaring and experience its extensive short-

62. See infra Part IV.B.2.
63. For a discussion of the extraterritoriality of U.S. environmental law, see Paul E. Hagen, The
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Environmental Laws, SK046 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 151 (2005) (providing an
overview); see also Browne C. Lewis, It’s a Small World After All: Making the Case for the
Extraterritorial Application of the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2143
(2004) (arguing for the extraterritorial application of the National Environmental Policy Act).
64. For an analysis of the geography of Hazelwood Mine and Power Station case, see infra Part
IV.B.
65. Motion Exparte Under Section 46(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
1999; Order 1 Rule 2(3) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure) [sic] Rules, Statement,
Barr v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig., No. FHC/CS/B/126/2005 (Nig. F.H.C. June 20, 2005),
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit/case.pleadings.20June2005.pdf
[hereinafter Motion Exparte].
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range effects, but also are vulnerable to localized environmental changes
due to global climate change.66
As in the Inuit case, however, the Nigerian plaintiffs are only one of
the populations experiencing the localized effects of global climate
change.67 These specific facts thus become representative of a broader
geography. The links between U.S. and European energy companies, gas
flaring in Nigeria, and dangerously thin ice on traditional travel routes in
the Arctic68 begin to emerge through a geographic analysis of the facts in
these lawsuits. This approach engages climate change as a phenomenon in
which local behavior in one place causes local impacts elsewhere.
b. Substantive Law
The geography of the substantive claims intertwines with that of the
facts, but may not be fully contiguous with it. Often the relevant law
covers a broader geographic area that includes the area in which the facts
are occurring. For example, the petitions to the World Heritage Committee
requesting that particular sites impacted by climate change be put on the
Committee’s danger list focus on the impacts of climate change in those
places.69 The geographic scope of danger-listing, however, includes more
than just those individual places.70 Similarly, Victoria’s Planning and
Environment Act71 covers the whole region rather than just the City of
Latrobe.
A place-based analysis of the substantive claims gives critical insight
into the power relations involved. It answers spatial questions about whose
regulatory authority is being invoked on what grounds, and in so doing,
reveals the levers of executive and legislative authority that undergird
these suits. The substantive laws have been created through a particular
place’s political process, and were crafted broadly or narrowly through
geographically bound entities. In the Minnesota state court case over

66. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Verifying Affidavit; see also THE CLIMATE JUSTICE
PROGRAMME & ENVTL. RIGHTS ACTION, GAS FLARING IN NIGERIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC MONSTROSITY (describing the impacts of gas flaring on local
communities through exposure to toxins and through resulting climate change).
67. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 49, available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/index.htm (discussing climate change impacts around the
world).
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
69. See infra Part VI.B.
70. For the list of world heritage sites in danger, see World Heritage Centre, World Heritage in
Danger, http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=158 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
71. Planning and Environment Act 1987, No. 45/1987 (1987), (amended 2005), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/paea1987254/.
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environmental valuation, for instance, the case hinged on whether the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission was appropriately implementing
the state legislature’s will in including carbon dioxide among air pollutants
that have a cost value associated with them.72
The court’s approach to the substantive legal claims similarly reflects a
place’s tradition of judicial interpretation and receptivity to adjudicators
making decisions that constrain externalities. In the Minnesota case, for
example, the court deferred to the Commission’s order under a substantial
evidence analysis.73 In another variation of balancing among branches, the
administrative tribunal in the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station case
exercised its interpretive authority regarding whether greenhouse gas
emissions should be included as part of the category of “environmental
effects” in a statute created by Victoria’s legislature.74
The substantive claims also provide insight into the petitioners’
decision-making processes, and so feed into the above analysis of the
actors’ geography. Generally, the particular substantive claims filed
represent only one potential characterization of the facts. The petitioners’
choice of claim is suggestive not just of strategy, but also of the
constraints under which the petitioners operate and through which they
view the situation.
c. Procedural Law
While the application of substantive law reveals the way in which
places’ power dynamics result in assertions of regulatory authority over
particular domains, the applicable procedural law demonstrates a place’s
structuring of opportunities among the various actors. Procedure can play
a role through statutes that provide particular procedural rights. For
example, in the German case against Hermes Euler HG, an export credit
agency, the nongovernmental organizations petitioning the court claimed
that the federal Environmental Information Act gave them the right to
information about the extent to which Hermes provides political and
economic risk insurance to projects that produce greenhouse gases.75 The
nongovernmental actors, which have both national and supranational

72. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
73. Id. at 802.
74. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict. Civ. &
Admin. Trib. 2004).
75. See Germanwatch & BUND, German Government Sued over Climate Change, http://www.
climatelaw.org/media/german.suit/briefing.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
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presences, are relying on a law created by the federal legislature for
leverage against the credit agency.
Procedure more commonly enters into lawsuits, however, through the
rules applicable to a particular forum, which must be complied with in
every lawsuit and may be created at multiple levels of government.76
Moreover, procedure is not simply used offensively by petitioners, but is
also used defensively by respondents.77 For example, in the case brought
against Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation for their failure to produce an environmental impact
assessment as part of their process of approving assistance for overseas
projects, respondents tried to move the case to Washington, D.C., a less
convenient location for petitioners, and to challenge standing.78
Because procedural issues are often outcome determinative—
adjudicating bodies generally do not reach the merits if they find a
procedural defect79 and the level of deference to lower courts is often
definitive on appeal80—the procedural statutes and rules represent a
powerful assertion of governmental authority. The entities creating the
statutes and rules are providing the parameters within which externalities
can be challenged, as well as the tools for doing so. A map of the
procedural claims thus provides a window into the political and social
context in which the struggle over externalities is occurring.
Together, these place-based relationships reveal the spatial matrix in
which the actors and claims operate and the ways in which that structure
shapes and constrains the role that such suits can play. These power
dynamics that underlie the litigation provide insight into the possibilities
for corporate responsibility in the energy sector.

76. For instance, filings in a civil case before the Central District of California must comply with
both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with local rules. See Central District of California U.S.
District Court, General Civil Filing Information, http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (follow “Filing
Procedures” hyperlink; then follow “General Civil Filing Information” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22,
2006).
77. For examples of offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel, see Brian Levine,
Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the Application of Collateral Estoppel to
Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 435.
78. See ClimateLawsuit.org, Media Kit, http://www.climatelawsuit.org/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2006).
79. For example, if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it will not reach the merits.
80. In the climate change litigation context, the D.C. Circuit recently failed to reach the merits on
the EPA’s denial of a petition asking it to regulate carbon dioxide emissions by motor vehicles under
the Clean Air Act. It held that the “EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion under
§ 202(a)(1) in denying the petition for rulemaking.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
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B. Spatial Implications
The diversity of actors and complex power relationships represented in
climate change litigation are a far cry from the state of the treaties that
constituted the Peace of Westphalia, which established the dominant
power of the nation-state through an agreement between governmental
representatives who had “implor’d the Divine Assistance.”81 These shifts
occurring in multiple legal contexts have led some to trumpet the death of
the Westphalian model, as part of the larger debate over the extent to
which the nation-state still matters in our globalized world.82
Although factual disagreements certainly occur, scholarly views of the
continued importance of nation-states often hinge on characterization of
agreed-upon facts. Many entities other than nation-states matter in the
modern global landscape, and non-state actors sometimes take on
traditional governmental functions.83 This growing international civil
society interacts in complex ways with the consent of sovereign states,
which may or may not diminish their importance depending on one’s
theoretical perspective.84
The geography of these cases exemplifies this complex landscape. A
wide range of actors representing a diversity of places interact through the
modality of a lawsuit. And yet governmental regulatory authority in
multiple guises plays a role in every suit, beginning with the tribunals
acting as adjudicators. Although national governmental entities—in their
varying roles as proponents or opponents of stronger limitations on
greenhouse gas emissions—do not act alone, efforts to control the

81. Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their
Respective Allies, Preamble, Oct. 24, 1648, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
westphal.htm [hereinafter Peace Treaty].
82. Such trumpeting would not be new. Numerous scholars have argued that the power of the
nation-state is in decline. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY? 8 (1989); KENICHI OHMAE,
THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 12 (1995); Ali Khan, The
Extinction of Nation-States, 7 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 197 (1992); John O. McGinnis, The Decline
of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 903 (1996). But see W. MICHAEL REISMAN, Introduction to JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW , at xiv (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999); William H. Lash, III, The Decline of the Nation State in
International Trade and Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1011, 1025 (1996) (“To paraphrase Mark
Twain, I conclude that accounts of the demise of the nation state are grossly exaggerated.”).
83. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text; see also Laura A. Dickinson, Government for
Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 135 (2005) (exploring the implications of corporations taking on traditional functions
of the armed services).
84. See supra note 82.
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externalities of energy production through court action ultimately must
rely upon their regulatory authority.
A map of the climate change litigation reveals three sets of
relationships that the regulator must navigate in order to be effective. Each
of these dynamics alone provides complex spatial questions. Together,
they represent a three-dimensional, intertwined morass that serves as a
formidable barrier to effective regulation of energy production’s
externalities. Diagram 1 attempts to visually capture those relationships in
a simplified, two-dimensional representation. Each element of the
diagram, pictured as a simple oval, is actually made up of the overlapping
entities portrayed in Diagrams 2, 3, and 4 respectively.85
Diagram 1
Axis 1
Multiscalar

Axis 2
Multibranch

Axis 3
Multiactor

Diagram 1 illustrates the intertwined axes that define the modified Westphalian terrain.

1. Multiscalar: Supranational, National, and Subnational
The nation-state is notably present in climate change litigation at every
level of government. In subnational actions, many of the corporate and
nongovernmental organization organizations are nationally based.86 The
national level cases not only occur in federal tribunals, but also include

85. See infra Diagrams 2–4. The spatial model I derived from these cases has some similarities to
the one presented by Anne-Marie Slaugher in A New World Order (2004). They both engage threedimensional, overlapping spaces, and our first two axes are describing the parallel types of
relationships; I use multiscalar where she uses vertical, and multibranch where she uses horizontal. My
focus within those two axes, however, is somewhat broader, with a more substantial engagement of
nongovernmental and subnational actors. Moreover, our third axes differ quite substantially, as she
looks at disaggregated international organizations, and I look at governmental-nongovernmental
dynamics. See id. at 18–23. An in-depth analysis of the relationship between transgovernmental
network theory and this model is beyond the scope of this Article. I plan to explore this relationship in
more depth, however, in the theoretical, normative companion piece to this Article.
86. See infra Part IV.
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governmental and nongovernmental national-level actors and invoke
federal statutory and constitutional law.87 The supranational petitions rely
upon treaties to which national governments are parties—the most
traditionally Westphalian nation-state role—and include those parties
either directly as respondents or indirectly as part of the proposed
solutions.88
And yet these nation-state-based regulatory elements exist in
interaction with other levels of government in every case. Because the
phenomenon of climate change occurs within multiple regulatory domains,
the tribunals themselves represent different types of governmental
authority. Moreover, each case provides a unique microcosm of the
subnational, national, and supranational dynamics represented in the
simplified Diagram 2 below. In asserting sovereign control over energy
production’s externalities, nation-states thus collaborate—and sometimes
conflict—with regulatory efforts at other levels of government. Although
this litigation potentially serves as a regulatory gap-filler to address
jurisdictional mismatches, it also embodies those spatial conflicts among
governmental levels.89
Diagram 2
Subnational

National

Supranational

Diagram 2 illustrates the interrelated levels of governance at which the regulatory
dynamics occur.

87. See infra Part V.
88. See infra Part VI.
89. William Buzbee extensively explored these mismatches in his article cited supra note 37.
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2. Multibranch: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
The traditional Westphalian model relies upon national executive
authority,90 but modern nation-states with at least somewhat democratic
governance structures generally also imbue legislative and judicial
branches with regulatory authority relevant to transnational problems, such
as energy production’s externalities.91 These cases are no exception. Each
one involves the invocation of judicial power, whether to regulate
corporate behavior directly92 or to force or prevent another government
entity from engaging in such regulation.93 The more common formulation
in the case studies is the latter one,94 with the result that many of these
cases represent regulatory battles among governmental branches,
sometimes at different levels of government.95
These inter-branch dynamics, as illustrated by the simplified Diagram 3
below, provide a second axis along which regulatory conflicts and
confluence emerge. Although the push and pull among branches
sometimes occurs at purely the nation-state level, in which case it can be
viewed as within the Westphalian actor, the cases often include interbranch conflicts at multiple levels of government.96 These jurisdictional
mismatches and resulting regulatory gaps97 become intertwined with
dynamics among executives, legislators, and judges.

90. See Peace Treaty, supra note 81, art. CXIX.
91. For example, the U.S. Senate must ratify treaties, and the U.S. federal courts have interpreted
the extent of the Executive’s foreign affairs powers. For an analysis of the relationship between
international law and executive power, see Janet Koven Levit, International Law Happens (Whether
the Executive Likes It or Not) (draft manuscript on file with author).
92. The national-level emissions case against U.S. power companies exemplifies this version, see
infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text, as does in part the Nigerian case against oil companies, see
infra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
93. The other national-level emissions case, against the U.S. EPA, exemplifies this version. See
infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
94. See infra Parts IV–VI.
95. The U.S. vehicle emissions case is the most dramatic example of intergovernmental conflicts.
See infra Part V.B.1.
96. The vehicle emissions case most starkly exemplifies this phenomenon. For a mapping of its
actors, see infra Part V.B.1.
97. See Buzbee, supra note 37, at 23–24 (exploring these mismatches in the context of
environmental federalism).
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Diagram 3
Executive

Judicial

Legislative

Diagram 3 illustrates the relationships among governmental branches that shape the
possibilities for regulation.

3. Multiactor: Governmental and Nongovernmental
As if the convoluted dynamics among the first two axes were not
sufficient to create a regulatory morass, the cases also contain a complex
geography of nongovernmental actors which both force and resist
regulation. These relationships among governmental and nongovernmental
entities form the third axis along which nation-states must navigate in
asserting their sovereign authority, as represented in simplified form in
Diagram 4 below. The national and subnational governments play a key
role in governing these nongovernmental entities, as a survey of the
geographic structures of the nongovernmental actors indicates. For
example, the nongovernmental organizations and the corporation involved
in the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station Case are regulated by national,
regional, and local governmental authorities.98
Moreover, the actors themselves often overlap. The lines between
corporations and nongovernmental organizations begin to blur as
corporate greenhouse gas emitters form nongovernmental organizations to
advocate on their behalf.99 As these different variations on
nongovernmental, nonprofit organizations team with governmental entities
on either or both sides of a lawsuit in which another governmental entity is
adjudicating,100 the distinctions among those advocating, regulating, and

98. See infra notes 132–40 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 187–91 and accompanying text.
100. All of the case studies present some variation of this dynamic. See infra Parts IV–VI.
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being regulated become less clear. And each of these entities relies upon
individuals, who sometimes play a direct role in the lawsuit as well.101
Governmental efforts at corporate regulation must navigate this
convoluted terrain in order to be effective.
Diagram 4
Individuals

NGOs

Corporations

Governmental
Entities

Diagram 4 illustrates the interrelated types of actors who comprise the categories of
petitioners, respondents, and adjudicators.

IV. MAPPING SUBNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
This Part and the two that follow map climate change litigation at
subnational, national, and supranational levels. In dissecting this series of
case studies, these Parts explore the implications of this adjudicative
geography for broader issues of regulating energy production’s
externalities.102 In so doing, these Parts do not aim to provide an
exhaustive catalog of the ever-increasing list of cases engaging global
climate change, but rather an exploration of representative cases that
include a diversity of actors and legal claims.103

101. The Nigerian case and some of the World Heritage Committee petitions include individuals
as petitioners. See infra Parts V.C.1., VI.B.1.
102. The Article’s aim is not to create a comprehensive summary of climate change litigation, but
rather to explore the implications of it. In selecting cases for my in-depth geographic analysis, I
focused on those that represented the diversity of substantive claims and the spatial variations within
categories of substantive claims.
103. For a detailing of the range of pending climate change litigation, see Climate Justice, supra
note 48.
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The two subnational cases analyzed in this Part focus on whether it is
appropriate for state or local administrative bodies to include greenhouse
gas emissions in environmental assessments of corporations engaged in
coal-based energy production. The first two sections explore ties to place
in each case, and then the third section reflects on the geography of
subnational climate change litigation.
A. Environmental Cost Valuation: Challenge to the Minnesota Scheme
At the direction of the state legislature, the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission established interim environmental cost values for five air
pollutants, one of which was carbon dioxide, which negatively impacts the
environment primarily by contributing to global climate change.104 A trade
association representing lignite coal producers, users, and suppliers
challenged the inclusion of carbon dioxide, but the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held in 1998 that the Commission’s order regarding carbon
dioxide values was supported by substantial evidence.105 The decision thus
provided judicial reinforcement of an administrative body’s
implementation of legislative environmental regulation of corporations
that produce electricity; this regulation remains in place today.106
1. Actors
The relators listed in the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision for In re
the Quantification of Environmental Costs107 included Western Fuels
Association,108 Dairyland Power Cooperative,109 Minnesota Power and

104. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
105. Id.
106. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.2422 (2004); see also MINN. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES VALUES UPDATED THROUGH 2004 (2005), http://www.puc.state.
mn.us/docs/eeupdate05.pdf (listing environmental externalities values in Minnesota for 1995 and
2004).
107. 578 N.W.2d 4794.
108. “Western Fuels Association, Inc. is a not-for-profit cooperative that supplies coal and
transportation services to consumer-owned electric utilities throughout the Great Plains, Rocky
Mountain and Southwest regions. Serving a wide variety of public power entities ranging from rural
electric generation and transmission cooperatives to municipal utilities, WFA offers its Members
diverse and extensive expertise in coal mining, coal procurement and transportation management.”
ANNUAL REPORT 2004: COAL IS WHERE YOUR POWER BEGINS, WESTERN FUELS ASSOCIATION
(2004), http://www.westernfuels.org/pdf/WFA2004AnnualReport.pdf. It has an office in Colorado and
an operations office in Wyoming. Id. Its Class A members are Basin Electric Power Cooperative
(North Dakota), Sunflower Electric Power Corporation (Kansas), and Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Association, Inc. (Colorado). Id.
109.
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Light,110 Center for Energy & Economic Development,111 Northern States
Power Company,112 Otter Tail Power Company,113 and Lignite Energy
Council.114 All of these entities produce power and/or represent companies
that produce power in Minnesota and the surrounding states, and many of
them have a national-scale operation.115 They have both localized and

With headquarters in La Crosse, Wis., Dairyland Power Cooperative is a generation and
transmission cooperative (G&T) that provides the wholesale electrical requirements and other
services for 25 electric distribution cooperatives and 20 municipal utilities in the Upper
Midwest.
....
Dairyland’s service area encompasses 62 counties in four states (Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Iowa and Illinois).
Dairyland Power Cooperative, System & Cooperatives, http://www.dairynet.com/about/system.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
110.
Minnesota Power, a division of ALLETE, provides electricity in a 26,000-square-mile electric
service territory located in northeastern Minnesota. Minnesota Power supplies retail electric
service to 135,000 retail customers and wholesale electric service to 16 municipalities.
Superior Water, Light & Power (SWL&P) sells electricity and natural gas and provides
water service in northwestern Wisconsin. SWL&P has 14,000 electric customers, 12,000
natural gas customers and 10,000 water customers.
Minnesota Power, Minnesota Power Facts, http://www.mnpower.com/about_mp/facts.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2006).
111.
The Center for Energy and Economic Development (CEED) is a non-profit group dedicated
to protecting the viability of coal-based electricity. Working at the local, state, and regional
levels, CEED communicates the truth about coal-conducting research, dispelling falsehoods,
and educating the public and government officials about coal-based electricity’s importance
to our way of life.
Center for Energy and Economic Development, About CEED, http://www.ceednet.org/
ceed/index.cfm?cid=7504 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). Its national office is in Alexandria, Virginia.
Center for Energy and Economic Development, Contact CEED, http://www.ceednet.org/ceed/
index.cfm?cid=7526 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
112. Northern States Power Company is headquartered in Wisconsin. “The Company's principal
activity is the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. The Company distributes its
electricity to approximately 230,000 retail customers in northwestern Wisconsin and in the western
portion of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.” Business.com Directory, Northern States Power
Company
Profile,
http://www.business.com/directory/energy_and_environment/electric_power_
utilities/northern_states_power_company/profile/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
113. Otter Tail Power Company is headquartered in Minnesota. It has power plants and customers
in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Otter Tail Power Company, Quick Facts,
http://www.otpco.com/AboutCompany/QuickFacts.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
114. Although Lignite Energy Council is listed as a respondent at the beginning of the opinion,
both its focus and the court’s reference to it later in the opinion as a relator suggest that the respondent
designation was erroneous. See In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 795–96, 799
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998). Lignite Energy Council, based in North Dakota, aims to “maintain a viable
lignite coal industry and enhance development of the region's lignite coal resources for use in
generating electricity, synthetic natural gas and valuable byproducts.” Lignate Energy Council, About
Us, http://www.lignite-energy-council.org/about/Index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
115. See supra notes 108–13.
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broader scale interests in minimizing the cost of power generation, and
hence want to limit the substances included in environmental cost
valuation.
The respondents listed in the Court of Appeals opinion included the
Environmental Coalition,116 North Dakota, the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission, the Minnesota Attorney General, the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, and the Minnesota Department of Public Service.117 All
of the respondents are either nonprofit organizations or governmental
entities that have both localized and broader scale interests in limiting the
environmental impact of power generation and tend to be supportive of
including greenhouse gases within the list of substances.118 The

116. The Environmental Coalition was referenced as a respondent at the beginning of the opinion,
and a relator in the middle of the opinion. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d at 795–96,
799. Given the brief submitted by the Environmental Coalition supporting the inclusion of carbon
dioxide values, Initial Brief of the Environmental Coalition on Substantive Issues, In re Quantification
of Envtl. Costs, MPUC Docket No. E-999/CI-93-583 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings Jan. 12, 1996),
available at http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/ecbrf1.html, it is most logical to treat the Coalition as a
respondent. “The Coalition was comprised of seven groups including: ME3 (Minnesotans for an
Energy Efficient Economy), Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Izaak Walton League of America,
American Wind Energy Association, Clean Water Action, American Lung Association, and the
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy.” ME3, Environmental Costs of Energy and
Electricity, http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). ME3 is a Minnesota-based
nonprofit focusing on “the transition to a clean, efficient, and fair energy system.” ME3, About ME3,
http://www.me3.org/me3descr.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). The Institute for Local Self-Reliance,
based in Minnesota and Washington, D.C., focuses on achieving ecologically sound communities that
participate with control in the global economy. See Institute for Local Self-Reliance, ISLR: A 20 Year
Track Record Promoting Sustainable Communities, http://www.ilsr.org/20yrhist.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2006). The Izaak Walton League of America has a national office in Maryland and a Midwest
office in Minnesota. The League describes itself as “one of the nation’s oldest and most respected
conservation organizations. With a powerful grassroots network of over 330 local chapters nationwide,
the League is dedicated to promoting common sense solutions to protecting our country’s natural
heritage and improving outdoor recreation opportunities for all Americans.” Izaak Walton League,
http://www.iwla.org/ (last visited May 26, 2006). The American Wind Energy Association is based in
Washington, D.C., and “promotes wind energy as a clean source of electricity for consumers around
the world.” American Wind Energy Association, General Information, http://www.awea.org/
aweainfo.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). “The mission of the American Lung Association® is to
prevent lung disease and promote lung health. The American Lung Association® is the oldest
voluntary health organization in the United States, with a National Office [in New York] and
constituent and affiliate associations around the country.” American Lung Association, About,
http://www.lungusa.org (follow “About” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). The Minnesota Center
for Environmental Advocacy is based in Minnesota and “uses legal action and legislative advocacy, as
well as research, communications and collaborations to improve Minnesota’s environment.”
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, http://www.mncenter.org/about.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2006).
117. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d at 795–96.
118. See, e.g., Initial Brief of Minnesota Pollution Control Agency on Substantive Issues, In re
Quantification of Envtl. Costs, MPUC Docket No. E-999/CI-93-583 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings
Jan. 12, 1996), available at http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/pcabrf1.html (supporting inclusion of
carbon dioxide emissions); Initial Brief of the Environmental Coalition on Substantive Issues, In re
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governmental entities are based in Minnesota and neighboring states. The
non-profit Coalition members range from those that are Minnesota-based
to those that are primarily nationally based.119
The adjudicator was Judge Randall of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals.120 That court heard the appeal after relators petitioned for a writ
of certiorari, following contested initial and reconsideration proceedings
before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.121 The decision-makers
thus reflect a much clearer tie to local geography than the parties do.
2. Claims
The facts of the environmental cost valuation case reflect a multiscalar
geography. The dispute was over an environmental cost valuation system
that applied within Minnesota and just outside its borders.122 This limited
range of the system itself provides the case with a subnational geography.
The reason that carbon dioxide was included in that system, however, was
to address a supranational problem. The facts of the case thus cross-cut
scale through a subnational environmental scheme including a
supranational environmental problem.
The applicable law, however, is clearly subnational. Every statute and
case relied upon by the court came from the Minnesota legislature and
courts.123 For example, the judicial analysis of transnational data, such as
the quality of the evidence in support of climate change, relied upon
Minnesota’s judicial standards for the discretion of the Administrative
Law Judge.124 The claims, as the state court system required, thus focused
on where the judicial action was taking place rather than on the broader
geography of the facts.
B. Environmental Review: Expansion of Coal-Based Energy in Victoria,
Australia
In Australia, the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station, which
contributes approximately twenty-two percent of Victoria’s base load

Quantification of Envtl. Costs, MPUC Docket No. E-999/CI-93-583 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings
Jan. 12, 1996), available at http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/ecbrf1.html (same)
119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
120. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
121. Id. at 796–97.
122. One of the contested issues was whether carbon dioxide values should apply 200 miles
beyond Minnesota state borders. Id. at 801–02.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 800–01.

55608-text.native.11581863009/13/2006

2005]

THE GEOGRAPHY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION

1823

electricity, was running out of coal and wanted to add an additional coal
field, which would allow the power station to operate through 2031.125 The
Minister for Planning approved a panel inquiry into the environmental
effects of the proposal, but provided terms of reference that excluded the
climate impacts from the use of coal to produce energy.126 Several
environmental groups challenged this exclusion, and in October 2004, the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Administrative Division,
directed the panel to hear submissions under provisions of the Planning
and Environment Act127 on the greenhouse gas impact from the new coal
field.128 Although the expansion ultimately went forward, the ruling
resulted in the first Victorian greenhouse reduction deed,129 which
establishes emissions caps, provides for surrender of some of Hazelwood’s
coal, calls for set milestones and reporting requirements, and encourages
development of renewable energy projects.130 Environment Victoria, with
support from the Australian Conservation Foundation and Greenpeace,
criticized this agreement as “window-dressing” on giving Hazelwood “the
right to pump out vast amounts of additional greenhouse pollution.”131 The
decision thus provided judicial forcing of administrative regulatory
behavior with respect to the power station that provided the basis for
innovative and controversial policy-making.
1. Actors
The petitioners before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
in Australian Conservation Foundation v. Latrobe City Council included
the Australian Conservation Foundation,132 World Wildlife Fund (WWF)–

125. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict. Civ. &
Admin. Trib. Oct. 29, 2004).
126. Id.
127. Planning and Environment Act, 1987 (Victoria, Austl.) (Act No. 45/1987), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/aul/legis/vic/consol_act/paeal987254/.
128. Id.
129. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Deed, available at http://www.doi.vic.gov.au/DOI/Internet/
Energy.nsf/AllDocs/88831B7277C9437DCA25701B00248D59?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 7,
2006).
130. See Fact Sheet 1, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Deed with IPRH, available at
http://www.doi.vic.gov.au/doi/doielect.nsf/2a6bd98dee287482ca256915001cff0c/4c055e0941b77e73c
a2570740006aaa7/$FILE/Fact%20Sheet%201%20-%20Greenhouse%20reduction.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2006).
131. Environment Victoria, http://www.envict.org.au (follow “Climate Change” hyperlink; then
follow “Hazelwood Power Station” hyperlink; then follow “Bracks’ condemns Victoria to Climate
Change” hyperlink).
132. Australia Conservation Foundation is a national nonprofit, membership-based organization
that has a head office in Melbourne and other offices around the country. It describes itself as
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Australia,133 Environment Victoria,134 and Climate Action Network
Australia (CANA).135 All four of them are Australian nonprofit
environmental organizations. With the exception of Environment Victoria,
the organizations have a primarily national or international geographic
base; both WWF and CANA are national branches of international
organizations, and Australia Conservation Foundation is a national-level
organization. Although they all have a presence in Victoria and hence
geographic ties to the subnational level, their agendas are mostly
intertwined with broader national and international objectives.136
The other parties in the case included the Latrobe City Council; the
Minister for Planning;137 and International Power Hazelwood.138 Although
the governmental entities are both tied to the local geography of the
plant—it is located in the Latrobe Valley—International Power
Hazelwood is owned by a multinational company headquartered in
London.139 The office of its Australian subsidiary, Australian National

“Australia's leading national . . . environment organisation.” Australia Conservation Foundation,
About ACF, http://www.acfonline.org.au/default.asp?section_id=1 (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
133. WWF–Australia, which has a head office in Sydney and other offices around Australia, “is
part of the WWF International Network, the world’s largest and most experienced independent
conservation organisation [WWF] has close to five million supporters and a global network active [in]
more than 100 countries.” WWF–Australia, About Us, http://www.wwf.org.au/about/ (last visited Mar.
31, 2006). “With over 80,000 supporters, and active projects in Australia and the Oceana region,
WWF works to conserve Australia’s plants and animals by ending land clearing, addressing climate
change, and preserving and protecting our freshwater, marine, and land environments.” Id.
134. Environment Victoria, based in Carlton, Victoria, “is the state’s peak non-government
environment organization.” Environment Victoria, About Us, http://www.envict.org.au (follow “About
Us” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
135. CANA, based in Ultimo, New South Wales, “is an alliance of over 30 regional, state and
national environmental, health, community development, and research groups from throughout
Australia. . . . CANA was formed in 1998 to be the Australian branch of the global CAN network, with
representative groups in over 70 nations.” CANA, About CANA, http://www.cana.net.au/index.
php?site_var=10 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
136. See sources cited supra notes 132–33, 135.
137. The Minister for Planning was represented by the Victorian Government Solicitor in the role
of observer. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict.
Civ. & Admin. Trib. 2004).
138. “International Power is a leading independent power generation company with interests in 37
power stations in 18 countries around the world.” International Power, The Company, http://www.
ipplc.com/ipplc/thecompany/.
International Power's Australian business region consists of the Hazelwood plant in Victoria
and the Pelican Point plant in South Australia, together with the Synergen peaking units
dispersed in South Australia.
Computer Business Review Online, International Power plc, http://www.cbronline.com/company
profile.asp?guid=C94E4191-2B68-4B5E-82F9-350FFF746264&CType=Background (last visited Feb.
27, 2006). The company’s head office is in London. Id.
139. See Environment Victoria, Corporate Profile of Hazelwood Power Station, http://envict.org/
au/inform.php?menu=5&Submenu=475&item=492 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006); International Power,
Contact Us, http://www.iplcc.com/iplcc/contactus/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
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Power, is located in Melbourne, Victoria.140 Like the other governmental
entities, the adjudicator—the Victorian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal—is also based at the state level.
2. Claims
The factual and legal claims in Australian Conservation Foundation v.
Latrobe City Council reflect a similar dynamic. The facts revolve around
the planning process for the development of a particular coal field located
within the ambit of the City of Latrobe, which is within Victoria. The
geography of the coal field and contested planning process is distinctly
subnational. As in the environmental cost valuation case, however, the
parties disputed whether the supranational environmental problem should
be included in the subnational process.141
The claims and opinion of the Victorian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal rely upon subnational and national law. The primary statute upon
which the analysis focuses is Planning and Environment Act 1987, which
was created by a subnational legislature.142 The case also references
several other subnational statutes and one national statute.143 Although the
ambit of applicable law is somewhat broader in this action—including the
national—the case’s analysis, like the Minnesota one, has a different legal
than factual geography. Subnational and national laws are applied not only
to the subnational facts, but also to the supranational ones.
C. Geography of Subnational Cases
These cases’ geography reflects the fundamentally local and regional
character of the legal structure in which they operate; the tribunals and
governmental parties all have clear connections to the places in which the
environmental assessments are occurring.144 The map of the non-state
actors, however, indicates the broader implications of these cases and their
interconnection with national and international power dynamics. In both
cases, although most of the corporate and nongovernmental actors had

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See International Power, supra note 139.
See Australian Conservation Found., [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029.
See supra note 127.
Id.
For an analysis of evolving state government approaches to climate change policy, see
BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY (2004).
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some connection to the locality in which the suit occurred, many of them
were primarily nationally or internationally based.
The scalar differences between the non-state actors involved in the
regulatory process and those entities actually regulating illuminates a core
challenge for local efforts to regulate the externalities of energy
production. The pollution-producing behavior occurs within the domain of
a locality or region. The transnational and national character of the
industry itself and of the nongovernmental organizations that concern
themselves with it, however, does not fit neatly within a locally focused
regulatory scheme.
The petitioners and respondents were aligned oppositely in the two
cases,145 but the underlying geography of the actors in each case reflected
the tension between the local character of the specific controversy and the
transnational scope of climate change. The decision-makers and
governmental parties all represented either the localities or states at the
focus of the controversy, but the nongovernmental parties had a more
complex geography. Although the corporations and nongovernmental
organizations had significant ties to the subnational areas in which the
disputes were taking place—and some were even locally or regionallybased—many of these non-state actors had broader national or
international agendas. The spatial center of gravity of the parties and
adjudicators was arguably subnational—Minnesota or Victoria—but both
sets of actors clearly reflected national and international tensions over
appropriate regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.
An analysis of the factual and legal claims in the two cases illuminates
their geographic tensions even more starkly. In both cases, the facts have
two distinct spatial elements: (1) the local environmental issue and (2) its
interconnection with the supranational environmental issue. The
applicable law, however, treats those facts through a primarily subnational
lens. The focus of the legal analysis in each case was on the laws of
Minnesota or Victoria, respectively.
In sum, not only do tribunals grapple with complex, transnational facts,
but they also engage parties whose center of gravity often is not locally
based. In order for subnational tribunals to engage these cases effectively,
they must bridge disparate geographies. These dynamics raise questions

145. The relators in the environmental cost valuation case were challenging a
legislative/administrative determination to treat carbon dioxide emissions as pollution, whereas the
petitioners in the land use case were pushing for its inclusion in an environmental assessment.
Compare In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) with
Australian Conservation Found., [2004] VCAT 2029.
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about subnational tribunals as transnational judicial spaces and as actors in
broader dialogue about climate change.146
V. MAPPING NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
The national-level cases present an even more spatially complex
terrain. Geographic diversity infuses these cases, which gain a nationallevel characterization primarily from the federal-level designation of the
tribunal in which they are brought. Although the cases that follow often
address interrelated substantive issues, each case involves a unique
arrangement of place-based relationships.
This analysis engages the national-level climate change cases that
focus substantively on emissions reduction and project financing. The
cases include a mix of public and private actors as plaintiffs and
defendants, and represent a form of governmental regulation of
corporations. Within each of the major substantive categories,
significantly different formulations of actors, facts, and legal claims
emerge. Because these cases are all brought at the same level of
government and engage interrelated facts, however, a comparative analysis
of their geographies is particularly useful. Paralleling the subnational
analysis, this Part explores the contours of each case and then provides an
analysis of the geography of national-level climate change litigation.
A. Emissions Regulation: U.S. Power Companies
Eight states and New York City sued six major power companies that
contribute “approximately one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector’s
carbon dioxide emissions.”147 They claimed that these emissions’
contribution to global warming injure public health, coastal resources,
water supplies, the Great Lakes, and economic interests, as well as
increase the risk of wildfires and catastrophic climate change;148 as a
result, these emissions constitute a public nuisance in violation of federal
common law, or, in the alternative, state law.149 The case was dismissed in
September 2005 by the Southern District of New York on the grounds that

146. I explore these issues in more depth in Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational
Corporate Responsibility: Mapping the Role of Subnational Climate Change Litigation, PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. J. (forthcoming 2006).
147. Complaint at 1, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(No. 04 Civ 5669), available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2004/04-076.pdf.
148. Id. at 30–41.
149. Id. at 1–2.
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it raised nonjusticiable political questions, due to the “identification and
balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national
security interests” requiring a policy determination by the political
branches.150 This case thus represents an effort to use the judiciary to
regulate the behavior of corporations through federal common law and
state-level law, an effort that this federal judicial actor objected to on the
grounds that such regulation was in the political branches’ purview.
1. Actors
The public nuisance case against the power companies presents the
simplest geography of actors of the three emissions regulation cases. The
petitioners include the states of California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, as well as the City of
New York.151 They are all subnational governmental entities that claim to
be bringing the action in order to protect their property and their citizens’
health, well-being, and natural resources.152
The defendants include American Electric Power Company, Inc.,153
American Electric Power Service Corporation,154 The Southern
Company,155 Tennessee Valley Authority,156 Xcel Energy Inc.,157 and
Cinergy Corporation.158 They are corporations involved in electricity
generation processes that rely on fossil fuels. Their operations span several
states within the United States,159 and they have an interest in minimizing

150. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
151. Complaint, supra note 147, at 1.
152. Id. at 3–5.
153. American Electric Power Company, Inc. (AEP) is a corporation with New York citizenship
and its principal place of business in Ohio. It generates electricity in Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 5.
154. American Electric Power Service Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AEP and has
the same citizenship and principal place of business. Its functions include providing management and
professional services to AEP’s electric utility subsidiaries. Id.
155. The Southern Company has Delaware citizenship, with its principal place of business in
Georgia. It is a registered public utility holding company with several domestic subsidiaries that
generate electricity in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi. Id. at 6.
156. Tennessee Valley Authority is a federal corporation, with its principal place of business in
Tennessee. It directly owns and operates facilities that generate electricity in Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Tennessee. Id. at *.
157. Xcel Energy Inc. has both citizenship and its principal place of business in Minnesota. It is a
registered public utility holding company with four domestic subsidiaries that generate electricity in
Colorado, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id. at 8.
158. Cinergy Corporation has Delaware citizenship, with its principal place of business in Ohio. It
is a registered public utility holding company with two subsidiaries that generate electricity in Indiana,
Kentucky, and Ohio. Id. at 9.
159. Id. at 5–10.
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regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. The adjudicator is the Southern
District of New York, a federal judicial entity that covers several
counties—Bronx, Dutchess, New York, Orange, Putnam, Rockland,
Sullivan, and Westchester—within New York State.160
2. Claims
The facts of this case present a multilevel geography. On the one hand,
the emissions by the defendant corporations and their sub-entities are
occurring in specific localities in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.161 Moreover, each of the defendants has
citizenship in a particular state.162 On the other hand, the suit focuses on
the emissions as a substantial portion of overall national U.S. emissions
and on their contribution to the supranational problem of climate
change.163
The claims for relief are simultaneously national and subnational.
Substantively, plaintiffs allege violations of the federal common law of
public nuisance, and in the alternative, state law public nuisance.164
Procedurally, they make federal law claims for subject matter and personal
jurisdiction and for venue,165 some of which rely upon connections to a
particular subnational area.166
B. Emissions Regulation: U.S. Vehicles
Twelve states, three cities, a U.S. territory, and thirteen
nongovernmental organizations are petitioners in a lawsuit under the
Administrative Procedure Act and Clean Air Act against the EPA, ten
other states, and nineteen industry and utility groups.167 The plaintiffs

160. See Southern District of New York, General Directory, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/
office.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
161. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. See Complaint, supra note 147, at 1.
164. Id. at 43–49.
165. Id. at 10–21.
166. For example, the venue and personal jurisdiction claims rely on the defendants’ connections
to and activities in the Southern District of New York. Id.
167. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) , cert. granted, 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S.
Dist. Col. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120). For a full listing of parties, see International Center for
Technology Assessment (ICTA), Global Warming Petitioners, http://www.icta.org/doc/global%
20warming%20petitioners%20final.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter ICTA Parties Listing].
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challenged the EPA’s denial of a petition requesting that it regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under section 202(a)(1) of
the Clean Air Act.168 Without reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit ruled in July 2005 that the EPA acted within its discretion
in deciding not to regulate the emissions,169 and the Circuit denied
rehearing en banc in December 2005.170 Petitioners filed a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court on March 2, 2006, which
was granted on June 26, 2006.171 This case thus represents an effort by
local and state executive branches and nongovernmental entities to use
judicial authority to force regulation by a federal executive branch agency,
an effort opposed by other state-level executive branch and corporate
representatives; a federal appeals court denied the case out of deference to
the discretion of that federal executive branch agency, a denial which is
now under review by the Supreme Court.
1. Actors
A geographic analysis of parties in the consolidated suit against the
EPA over its refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act is far more convoluted, but reveals the
scope and complexity of the power dynamics involved. The governmental
petitioners include twelve U.S. states: California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington; the U.S. territory of American
Samoa; and three cities: Baltimore, New York, and Washington, D.C.172

168. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) , cert. granted, 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S.
Dist. Col. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120).
169. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
170. Massachusetts v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
171. Massachusetts v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W.
3517 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2006), cert. granted 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S. Dist. Col. June 26, 2006) (No. 051120); see also Nick Miles, Top US Court to Take on CO2 Case, BBC NEWS, June 27, 2006, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5118792.stm; Supreme Court to Hear Key Environment Case,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/26/washington/APScotus-Greenhouse-Gases.html?hp&ex=1151380800&en=43ce6578058bddbf&ei=5094&partner=
homepage. The questions presented in the petition for writ of certiorari are: “1. Whether the EPA
Administrator may decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy
considerations not enumerated in section 202(a)(1). 2. Whether the EPA Administrator has authority to
regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associated with climate change under section
202(a)(1).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Massachusetts v. EPA, 2006 WL 558353 (U.S.) (No. 051120).
172. ICTA Parties Listing, supra note 168; see also Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated
Cases, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (No. 03-1361) (D.C. Cir. 2005), available at
http://www.icta.org/doc/Petitioners'%20Final%20Brief%201.25.05.pdf.
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The thirteen nongovernmental organizations that are also petitioners
include Bluewater Network,173 Center for Biological Diversity,174 Center
for Food Safety,175 Conservation Law Foundation,176 Earthjustice,177
Environmental Advocates of New York,178 Greenpeace,179 International
Center for Technology Assessment,180 National Environmental Trust,181
Natural Resources Defense Council,182 Public Interest Research Group,183

173. Bluewater Network is a nonprofit organization based in San Francisco. See Final Brief for the
Petitioners in Consolidated Cases, supra note 172, at iv; About Bluewater Network, http://www.
bluewaternetwork.org/aboutus.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). Bluewater Network is a division of
Friends of the Earth, id., which “is the U.S. voice of an influential, international network of grassroots
groups in 70 countries,” Friends of the Earth International. Friends of the Earth, Who We Are,
http://www.foe.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
174. Center for Biological Diversity is a nonprofit organization based in Arizona, with other
offices in New Mexico, California, Oregon, and Washington, D.C. It has 13,000 members nationwide,
and it works to protect endangered species. Center for Biological Diversity, Fact Sheet, http://www.
biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/aboutus/factsheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
175. Center for Food Safety is a nonprofit organization with a national office in Washington,
D.C., and a West Coast office in San Francisco. It was “established in 1997 by its sister organization,
International Center for Technology Assessment, for the purpose of challenging harmful food
production technologies and promoting sustainable alternatives.” The Center for Food Safety, About
Us, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/about_us.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
176. “Conservation Law Foundation is a nonprofit, member-supported organization with offices
in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.” Conservation Law
Foundation, http://www.clf.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). It focuses on advocacy involving
protecting the environment in New England. Id.
177. Earthjustice is a nonprofit law firm that works to protect the environment. Its national
headquarters are in California, and it also has offices in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Montana,
Washington, and Washington, D.C. See Earthjustice, About Us, http://www.earthjustice.org/about/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
178. Environmental Advocates of New York is a nonprofit organization based in New York State
that works to protect the environment in the state. Environmental Advocates of New York, About Us,
http://www.eany.org/aboutus/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
179. Greenpeace is a nonprofit organization whose national headquarters are in Washington, D.C.
It engages in advocacy throughout the United States and around the world. First Amended Compliant
[sic] for Declaratory Relief and Writ of Mandamus or Other Order, at 7–8, Int’l Ctr. for Tech.
Assessment v. Whitman, No. 02-2376 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.icta.org/doc/
CO2PetAmendCompliant.pdf.
180. International Center for Technology Assessment is a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization that
is incorporated in Washington, D.C., and engages in advocacy at a local, state, and federal level
throughout the United States. Id. at 2–5.
181. National Environmental Trust is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., that
provides public education campaigns on the environment around the United States. National
Environmental Trust, About Us, http://www.net.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
182. Natural Resources Defense Council is a nonprofit organization with New York headquarters,
as well as offices in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Contact Us, http://www.nrdc.org/contactUs/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). It has over one
million members around the United States and works on a range of domestic and international
environmental issues. See Natural Resources Defense Council, About Us, http://www.nrdc.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
183. The U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) is a nonprofit based in Washington, D.C.,
with regional field offices in Massachusetts, Georgia, Louisiana, Arizona, and Hawaii. U.S. PIRG,
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Sierra Club,184 and Union of Concerned Scientists.185 They are
subnationally based, nationally based, and internationally based
organizations engaged in environmental advocacy. Three additional
nonprofit organizations filed amici briefs in support of the petitioners.186
The parties aligned with the respondent are similarly diverse. In
addition to the initial respondent, the EPA, ten states187 and three entities
representing industry and utility companies188 intervened in the lawsuit in
support of the respondent. The ten states were Alaska, Idaho, Kansas,
Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and Texas.
The industry intervenor-respondents were grouped into three coalitions:
the Vehicle Intervenor Coalition,189 the CO2 Litigation Group,190 and the

Contact Us, http://uspirg.org/uspirg.asp?id2=10359 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). It was created by state
PIRGs, which operate in numerous states around the United States. It works on environmental,
consumer, democracy, and higher education issues. U.S. PIRG, About Us, http://uspirg.org/uspirg.
asp?id2=10115&id3=USPIRG& (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
184. The Sierra Club is a nonprofit organization incorporated under California law that engages in
advocacy throughout the United States and internationally. See First Amended Compliant [sic] for
Declaratory Relief and Writ of Mandumus or Other Order, supra note 179, at 5–7.
185. Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is a nonprofit organization with a national office in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, as well as offices in Washington, D.C., and Berkeley, California. “UCS is
an independent nonprofit alliance of more than 100,000 concerned citizens and scientists. [It]
augment[s] rigorous scientific analysis with innovative thinking and committed citizen advocacy to
build a cleaner, healthier environment and a safer world.” Union of Concerned Scientists, About UCS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/about/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
186. ICTA Parties List, supra note 168 (listing Physicians for Social Responsibility, Indigenous
Environmental Network, and REDOIL (Resisting Environmental Devastation on Indigenous Lands) as
Amici for the petitioners).
187. See Final Brief for the Intervenor States of Michigan, Texas, Idaho, North Dakota, Utah,
South Dakota, Alaska, Kansas, Nebraska, and Ohio, and the Amicus State of Indiana in Support of
Respondent United States Environmental Protection Agency, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (No.
03-1361) (D.C. Cir. 2005), available at http://209.200.74.155/doc/StateIntervenorFinalBrief1-21.pdf.
188. For a detailed description of those three entities, see infra notes 189–91 and accompanying
text.
189. The Vehicle Intervenor Coalition consists of four entities that represent companies involved
in the automotive industry: the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Auto Alliance), the National
Automobile Dealers Association, the Engine Manufacturers Association, and the Truck Manufacturers
Association. Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, Massachusetts, 415 F.3d 50 (No. 031361), available at http://209.200.74.155/doc/IndustryIntervenorRespondentsFinalBrief1-25.pdf. The
Auto Alliance has its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and also has offices in California and
Michigan. Auto Alliance, Contact the Alliance, http://www.autoalliance.org/about/contact.php (last
visited Apr. 1, 2006). It “is a trade association of 9 car and light truck manufacturers including BMW
Group, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche,
Toyota and Volkswagen.” Auto Alliance, About the Alliance, http://www.autoalliance.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The National Automobile Dealers Association, founded in 1917 [with its main
office in McLean, Virginia], represents more than 19,700 new car and truck dealers, both domestic and
international, with more than 43,000 separate franchises.” National Automobile Dealers Association,
About NADA, http://www.nada.org/template.cfm?Section=AboutNADA (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
“Since 1968, the Engine Manufacturers Association[, based in Chicago, Illinois,] has been the voice of
the engine manufacturing industry on domestic and international public policy, regulatory, and
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technical issues that impact manufacturers of engines used in a broad array of mobile and stationary
applications.” Engine Manufacturers Association, Who Is EMA, http://www.enginemanufacturers.org/
about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). The Truck Manufacturer’s Association, based in Washington, D.C.,
represents companies “engaged in the design, development, manufacturing, marketing and sale of
medium- and heavy-duty trucks, truck chassis and truck tractors.” Joint Brief of Industry IntervenorRespondents, supra, Corporate Disclosure Statement at 2. Accord Truck Manufacturers Association,
Who We Are, http://www.truckmanufacturersassociation.org/WhoWeAre.asp?id=2 (last visited Mar.
1, 2006).
190. “CO2 Litigation Group is an informal organization of trade associations and business
organizations formed to fund and conduct litigation concerning potential regulation of carbon dioxide
emissions.” Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 189, Addendum at 1. It has
twelve members with an interest in the litigation. Id., Addendum at 2–8. American Petroleum Institute
is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., with offices in twenty-seven state capitals. It
represents over 400 oil and gas companies. American Petroleum Institute, About API, http://apiec.api.org/aboutapi/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). American Forest & Paper Association, based in
Washington, D.C., “is the national trade association of the forest, pulp, paper, paperboard and wood
products industry. . . . AF&PA’s members include manufacturers of over 80 percent of the paper,
wood and forest products produced in the United States.” American Forest & Paper Association,
About AF&PA, http://www.afandpa.org/Template.cfm?section=About_AFandPA (last visited Mar. 1,
2006). American Iron and Steel Institute, based in Washington, D.C., “represents 19 North American
steel mills.” Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 189, Addendum at 3. Accord
American Iron and Steel Institute, http://www.steel.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). Business
Roundtable, based in Washington, D.C., “is an association of chief executive officers of
[approximately 160] leading U.S. corporations with a combined workforce of more than 10 million
employees.” Business Roundtable, About Us, http://www.businessroundtable.org/aboutUs/index.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, based in Washington, D.C., represents
“more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions. It includes hundreds of associations,
thousands of local chambers, and more than 100 American Chambers of Commerce in 91 countries.”
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, About Us, http://www.uschamber.com/about/ (last visited May 26,
2006). “Founded August 14, 1961 [and based in Alexandria, Virginia], the National Association of
Convenience Stores (NACS) is an international trade association representing 2,352 retail and 1,991
supplier company members. NACS member companies do business in nearly 40 countries around the
world, with the majority of members based in the United States.” NACS Online, About NACS,
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/TopNav/About_NACS/default.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
“Seventy percent of its members sell gasoline and diesel fuel, which, in 2002, accounted for more than
$280 billion in sales.” Joint Brief of Industry-Intervenor Respondents, supra note 189, Addendum at 5.
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) “is the nation’s largest industrial trade association,
representing small and large manufacturers in every industrial sector and in all 50 states.
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the NAM has 10 additional offices across the country.” National
Association of Manufacturers, Profile and Mission, http://www.nam.org/s_nam/sec.asp?CID=
26&DID=24 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). National Petrochemical and Refiners Association is based in
Washington, D.C., and its “members include more than 450 companies, including virtually all U.S.
refiners and petrochemical manufacturers.” NPRA, Info on NPRA, http://www.npradc.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2006). “Founded in 1916 [and based in Skokie, Illinois, with an office in Washington,
D.C.], the Portland Cement Association represents cement companies in the United States and
Canada.” Portland Cement Association, About PCA, http://www.cement.org/pca/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2006). The Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America, based in Reston, Virginia, “is the
premier national trade association representing independent chain retailers and marketers of motor
fuel, both branded and unbranded.” Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America, About
SIGMA, http://www.sigma.org/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). The Specialty Steel
Industry of North America (SSINA), based in Washington, D.C., “is a voluntary trade association
representing virtually all the producers of specialty steel in North America.” The Stainless Steel
Information Center, About SSINA, http://www.ssina.com/about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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Utility Air Regulatory Group.191 These coalitions represent a wide range of
local, national, and transnational entities involved in business generally
and in the processes that lead to the release of greenhouse gases in
particular.192 Congressman John Dingell of Michigan, the Washington
Legal Foundation, and the State of Indiana also filed amici briefs on behalf
of the respondents.193 The petitioners and respondents thus include both
governmental and nongovernmental entities that span numerous
geographies at multiple levels.
The judicial actor in this case is a national-level court with a
geographic tie to Washington, D.C. The adjudicator in the latest opinion in
the case was the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.194 The adjudicator
currently is the U.S. Supreme Court, also based in Washington, D.C., but
serving as the highest court of the nation-state.195
2. Claims
Although they engage multiple spaces, the claims in the motor vehicle
emissions case have a far more straightforward geography than the actors
do. The facts involve the U.S. EPA’s denial of a national-level rulemaking
petition under a national-level law, the Clean Air Act, to address emissions
that contribute to the supranational phenomenon of climate change, which

Based in Washington, D.C.,
[t]he Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA) consists of 39 North American companies that
operate 125 steel plants and employ approximately 40,000 people. The SMA also has six in
countries outside of North America, comprising a total membership of 45 steel companies,
worldwide.
The North American member companies of the SMA are widely dispersed
geographically with 33 located in the United States, three companies in Canada, and three in
Mexico. The [U.S.] companies are represented in the United States Congress by 122
Congressional Districts within 37 states.
The SMA is the primary trade association for scrap-based electric arc furnace (EAF)
steelmakers.
Steelnet, The Steel Manufacturers Association, http://www.steelnet.org/about/index.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2006).
191. The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) “is a not-for-profit trade association of individual
electric generating companies and national trade associations that participates collectively in
administrative proceedings, and in litigation arising from those proceedings, that affect electric
generators under the Clean Air Act.” Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 189,
UARG Disclosure Statement at 1. UARG does not specify in its statement in the Joint Brief which of
its members are participating in the consolidated proceedings. See id. at 1–2.
192. See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
193. For a full listing of parties, see ICTA Parties Listing, supra note 168.
194. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, (D.C. Cir. 2005).
195. See SUP. CT. R. 10-16; sources cited supra note 171.
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has localized effects at a subnational level.196 The substantive and
procedural claims made by the petitioners rely upon national-level statutes
to address these facts that range in scale. They argue that section 202(a)(1)
of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles, and that the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act does not preclude such regulation.197 They appeal based
on the Administrative Procedure Act, and argue that the EPA acted
arbitrarily in denying the petition.198 They claim that the court has
jurisdiction based on specific provisions of federal statutes.199
C. Emissions Regulation: Nigerian Oil Companies’ Gas Flaring
Eight individuals, each of whom lives in a different community
impacted by gas flaring, sued six oil companies and the attorney general of
Nigeria for violations of sections 33(1) and 33(4) of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria—as reinforced by Articles 4, 16, and 24 of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights—and of the
Environmental Impact Assessment Act.200 They claimed that the gas
flaring violates “their fundamental rights to life and dignity of human
person,” and they requested both declaratory and injunctive relief.201 After
the filing of this suit, the Executive Director of Environmental Rights
Action/Friends of Earth Nigeria (ERA) was detained for two hours for
questioning that included discussion of the lawsuit.202 In November 2005,
however, the Federal High Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial Division
granted declaratory relief, enjoined the gas flaring by Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Limited (Shell Nigeria) and the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and ordered legislative
processes to begin amending a problematic statute.203 After the gas flaring
continued, petitioners filed contempt of court proceedings against Shell
Nigeria and NNPC.204 On April 11, 2006, the Federal High Court of

196. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d 50.
197. Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases, supra note 172.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Statement at 1–2.
201. Id.
202. Climate Justice, Executive Director of Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth
Nigeria (ERA), Detained for Two Hours at Lagos Airport (July 8, 2005), http://www.climatelaw.org/
media/bassey.detained.
203. Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria Ltd. et al., [2005]—F.H.C.N.L.R.—(Nigeria),
available at www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit.nov2005/ni.shell.nov05.decision.pdf.
204. Press Release, Shell Accused of Contempt of Court over Continued Illegal Gas Flaring,
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/shell_accused_of_contempt_16122005.html.
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Nigeria ordered Shell Nigeria and NNPC to end the flaring by April 2007
and to appear before the court on May 31, 2006 with a detailed plan for
doing so.205 This action thus is an effort by individuals, with the support of
nongovernmental organizations, to use the federal judiciary to regulate
corporations directly and to force regulatory behavior by the federal
executive branch, a role that the judiciary decided to play in its November
2005 and April 2006 orders.
1. Actors
The Nigerian gas flaring case represents yet another geographic
variation. The plaintiffs are citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
also members of eight communities within the Niger Delta State.206 As
such, they connect to place at a national level through their citizenship and
at a state and local level through their residence and longstanding
community ties. In filing this suit, these individuals were supported by
ERA, a Nigerian nongovernmental organization that is a chapter of
Friends of the Earth International, an international nongovernmental
organization.207
The defendants include one national-level governmental actor, the
Attorney General of the Federation, and six corporations: Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Limited,208 Total/Fina/Elf Limited,209

205. Press Release, Shell Ordered to Appear by Nigerian Court, http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/
press_releases/shell_ordered_to_appear_by_11042006.html.
206. Those communities are Rumuekpe, Imiringi, Gbarain, Iwherekan, Eremah, Akala-Olu,
Idama, and Eket. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Verifying Affidavit at 1–2.
207. See Press Release, Climate Justice, Communities Sue Oil Companies to Stop Nigerian Gas
Flaring (June 20, 2005), http://www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit; ERA, About Us,
http://www.eraction.org/modules.php?name=About_ERA (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
208. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) has offices in Lagos,
Port Hartcourt, Abuja, and Warri. Shell Nigeria, Contact Us, http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?
siteId=nigeria (follow “Contact Us” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
SPDC is the pioneer and leader of the petroleum industry in Nigeria. It has the largest acreage
in the country from which it produces some 43 per cent of the nation's oil. The company's
operations are concentrated in the Niger Delta and adjoining shallow offshore areas where it
operates in an oil mining lease area of around 31,000 square kilometres. SPDC has more than
6,000 kilometres of pipelines and flowlines, 87 flowstations, 8 gas plants and more than 1,000
producing wells.
Shell Nigeria, The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), http://www.
shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=nigeria (follow “About Shell Nigeria” hyperlink; then follow
“What We Do” hyperlink; then follow “Exploration and Production” hyperlink; then follow “Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC)” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “Shell
Companies in Nigeria are part of the Shell Group whose diverse activities contribute to the economies
of over 135 countries.” Shell Nigeria, Structure, http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteID=
nigeria (follow “About Shell Nigeria” hyperlink; then follow “Who We Are” hyperlink; then follow
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Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited,210 Chevron/Texaco Nigeria
Limited,211 Mobil Producing Nigeria Limited,212 and Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation.213 The first five corporate defendants are all joint
ventures between major multinational oil corporations and the sixth
defendant, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, that engage in oilrelated activities in the plaintiff’s communities.214 As a result, these

“Structure” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
209.
Total Fina Elf is one of the first world’s largest international oil companies. With operations
in over 100 countries, Total Fina Elf’s activities cover the entire oil chain, from the upstream
(exploration, development and oil and gas production) through to downstream (refining and
distribution of oil products and international trading of crude oil and products).
GROUPE BRUXELLES LAMBERT, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 25 (2001), available at http://en.gbl.be/
Images/9_2271.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). Elf Nigeria Limited is a joint venture between Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation and Total Fina Elf that “produces about 125,000 [barrels per day],
from 12 onshore and offshore fields. ELF has its operational base in Port Harcourt.” Nigerian Oil &
Gas Online, Major Joint Venture Companies, http://www.nigerianoil-gas.com/upstream/joint_
venture_companies.htm#ELF (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
210. The Nigerian Agip Oil Company, “[t]he fourth largest oil producer in Nigeria[,] is owned by
[Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation] (60%), Agip Oil (20%), and Phillips Petroleum (20%).
Current production is about 145,000 [barrels per day], from 146 producing wells. The company
operates an export terminal at Brass, and has its operational base in Port Harcourt.” Nigerian Oil &
Gas Online, supra note 209.
211. “Texaco, (now ChevronTexaco) has been involved in exploration and production of Nigerian
crude oil resources since 1961. Over 473 million barrels of oil have been produced since operations
commenced. Texaco has its operational base at Warri, and its headquarters in Lagos.” Id.
212.
This is a joint venture [(JV)] that is now the second largest operation in the country. The JV
also has the only condensate operation in Nigeria, and is owned by [igerian National
Petroleum Corporation] (60%), and Mobil Oil (40%).
Most of Mobil’s production is from shallow water offshore fields, with its operating unit
based in the southeast location of Eket.
Id.
213.
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [NNPC] was formed in 1977 through the
merger of some of the departments of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and the old
Nigerian National Oil Corporation. The Corporation has sole responsibility for upstream and
downstream developments, and is also charged with regulating and supervising the oil
industry on behalf of the Nigerian Government. In 1988, the corporation was commercialised
into 12 strategic business units.
Nigerian Oil & Gas Online, The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, http://www.nigerianoilgas.com/upstream/npcc.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). Accord Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation, About NNPC, http://www.nnpcgroup.com/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006), NNPC
is headquartered in Abuja. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Contact NNPC, http://www.
nnpcgroup.com/contactus.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
214. The industry is dominated by six major joint venture operations managed by a number of
well known multinationals, Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Agip, Elf, and Texaco. The production concessions
are managed through joint venture companies, in which the Nigerian Government, through the
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), holds about 60% shareholding. The foreign joint
venture partners manage the operations, under a joint equity financing structure regulated by a Joint
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corporate entities have local, national, and international connections to
place.
The Motion Exparte and the contempt of court proceedings were
brought in the Federal High Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial
Division,215 and that court responded to them.216 The decision-makers are
part of the national government, but are based in the particular locality of
Benin City.
2. Claims
Like the other two emissions cases, the Nigerian oil-company gas
flaring case contained claims that connect to multiple regulatory levels.
The facts focused on the local impacts of subnational gas flaring in
particular communities. These impacts were framed, however, both in
terms of localized pollution and in terms of the effect on these
communities from the flaring’s contribution to the supranational problem
of climate change.217 The legal claims relied upon both national and
supranational law. Petitioners claimed a violation of Nigeria’s
Constitution, as reinforced by articles of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights, as well as of the Environmental Impact Assessment
Act. They further argued that the federal statute authorizing the flaring, the
Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, is unconstitutional.218
D. Project Finance: U.S. Agency Assistance for Overseas Projects
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and four U.S. cities brought a lawsuit
under the National Environmental Policy Act and Administrative
Procedure Act challenging the failure of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States to produce
an environmental impact assessment as part of the process of approving
loans, insurance, and other assistance for overseas projects.219 Plaintiffs
claimed, in particular, that these projects produce annual greenhouse gas
emissions equivalent to almost two-thirds of U.S. annual carbon dioxide

Operating Agreement. Nigerian Oil & Gas Online, Upstream, http://www.nigerianoil-gas.com/
upstream/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
215. Motion Exparte, supra note 65.
216. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text.
217. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Verifying Affidavit at 4–6.
218. See id., Statement at 4.
219. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), Friends of the Earth,
Inc., v. Watson, No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2002), available at http://www.climatelawsuit.org/
documents/Complaint_2Amended_Declr_Inj_Relief.pdf.
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emissions, and thus provide a substantial contribution to global
warming.220 In August 2005, the Northern District of California denied the
defendants’ summary judgment motion.221 This case thus represents an
ongoing effort to use the judiciary to force administrative compliance with
federal-level legislatively created law with respect to funding corporate
projects.
1. Actors
The petitioners in the U.S. project finance case include four local
governmental entities—the cities of Boulder, Colorado; Arcata, California;
Oakland, California; and Santa Monica, California—and two
nongovernmental organizations, Friends of the Earth, Inc., and
Greenpeace, Inc.222 Both of the nongovernmental organizations operate at
a local, national, and international level, and are involved with other
climate change litigation.223 The defendants are two individuals being sued
in their official capacity as officers of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC)224 and the Export-Import Bank of the United States
(ExIm).225 OPIC and ExIm are both nationally based governmental entities
engaged in transnational financial operations. The lawsuit is before the
San Francisco Division of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California. The judge is thus an individual who functions as part of the
national government, but has subnational ties to place.
2. Claims
The facts in the case against OPIC and ExIm also occur at multiple
levels. OPIC and ExIm are engaging in national level assistance for

220. Id. at 2.
221. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. 02-4106, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23,
2005).
222. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219.
223. See supra notes 173, 179, 207 and accompanying text.
224. “OPIC is authorized by 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291 to 2200b [sic], a part of the Foreign Assistance
Act. OPIC was created ‘[t]o mobilize and facilitate the participation of the United States private capital
and skills in the economic and social development of less developed countries and areas.’ 22 U.S.C.
§ 2191.” Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219, at 5. It
is a U.S. government development agency based in Washington, D.C. Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, http://www.opic.gov/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
225. “ExIm is the official export credit agency of the United States. It offers working capital
guarantees, export credit insurance, direct loans and loan guarantees to benefit U.S. exporters. It is
governed by the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, 12 U.S.C. § 635.” Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219, at 6. Its headquarters are in Washington, D.C.
ExIm Bank, Contact Us, http://www.exim.gov/contactus.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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projects occurring in localities in other nations. Both cities and specific
individuals who are based in particular substate localities and are members
of the nongovernmental organizations have claimed to be affected by the
contributions of these projects to global climate change.226 The substantive
and procedural legal claims rely on national level laws, but have
subnational and supranational components due to the nature of the facts.
Substantively, petitioners argued that OPIC and ExIm violated the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to conduct
environmental review of the overseas projects.227 Procedurally, they
claimed the court has jurisdiction and venue based on Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, but their venue analysis had subnational dimensions, such
as the fact that at least one plaintiff resides in the court’s district.228
E. Project Finance: German Agency Assistance for Overseas Projects
In 2003, Germanwatch and Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND)
submitted a request for information under the Environmental Information
Act regarding the support of energy production projects by export credit
agency Euler Hermes AG, which provides economic and political risk
insurance for exports to developing and transitional countries.229 The
Ministry of Economics and Labour refused their request, and in June 2004,
Germanwatch and BUND brought an action against the Ministry in the
Administrative Court in Berlin.230 They claimed Hermes provides
significant support for projects that produce substantial greenhouse gas
contributions, and that the Act provides them with the right to this
information so that they can insure it is taken into account in the decisionmaking process.231 A first hearing took place in July 2005, and the court
issued an order that constituted part of a settlement in January 2006; the
order required the defendant to provide detailed information on the
greenhouse gas implications of projects in the field of energy
production.232 This case thus represents a successful effort to use the
judiciary to force an administrative ministry to comply with a federal-level

226. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Id. at 3–4.
229. Germanwatch & BUND, supra note 75.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. For relevant documents, see Climate Justice, Climate Impacts of German Export Credits to
Be Disclosed, http://www.climatelaw.org/media/Germany (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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legislatively created law in an effort to influence funding of corporate
projects.
1. Actors
The petitioners in the German case, Germanwatch233 and BUND,234 are
German nongovernmental organizations. They each have a subnational
presence and ties to nongovernmental organizations operating in other
countries and internationally. The respondent is the German Ministry of
Economics and Labour (BMWA), a national-level government entity that
is the lead supervisor of the activities of German export credit agencies.235
The petitioners focused on this respondent because they sought
information from one of the export credit agencies regulated by the
BMWA, Euler Hermes AG (Hermes), which is a corporate entity active at
both national and supranational levels.236 Petitioners brought the action in
the Administrative Court in Berlin, and the judge is thus a representative
of the federal government based in a particular subnational geographic
location.237
2. Claims
The action against Hermes also reflects its national-level setting while
incorporating subnational and supranational elements. The action focused
on Hermes’ provision of export guarantees for German companies’

233. Germanwatch is a nonprofit and nongovernmental North-South initiative with offices in
Berlin and Bonn. It focuses on trade, environment, and North-South relations, and it networks with
organizations in developed and developing countries. Germanwatch, http://www.germanwatch.org/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
234. BUND, the German branch of Friends of the Earth, began as a federation of pre-existing
regional groups. It has 390,000 members who are active in 2,200 regional and local groups. BUND,
http://www.bund.net/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
235. Germanwatch & BUND, supra note 75, at 1.
236. Id.
Following the incorporation of Hermes in 2002, Euler Hermes has strengthened its
international position and expanded its range of products. As the leading credit insurer in
Germany, Hermes has built up key positions in Eastern and Northern Europe. It is also a
leading player in the bonding and guarantees business.
A member of the Allianz Group, and a subsidiary of AGF, Euler Hermes benefits of [sic]
the financial solidity to provide long-term support for clients. Throughout 2003, the Group
integrated the name Euler Hermes in all its Business Units. Euler Hermes, today the world's
leading credit insurer, employs 5400 staff members worldwide and has a market share of
34%.
Euler Hermes, The Specialist in Receivables management, http://www.eulerhermes.com/group/en/
who_we_are/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
237. See Germanwatch & BUND, supra note 75, at 1.
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exports to developing and economically transitional countries, a
transnational process. The nongovernmental organizations requested
information regarding the insured projects’ production of greenhouse gas
emissions—which contribute to supranational global climate change but
occur in particular localities—from national ministries that supervise the
activities of Hermes in Germany. The lawsuit resulted from those
ministries’ denial of the request.238
The legal claims have both national and supranational dimensions. The
action asked the court to force the federal government to give the
requested information, based on the Environmental Information Act of the
Federal Republic of Germany. The petitioners further relied upon the
European Court of Justice’s interpretation of EU Directive 90/313, which
has been transposed into German law by the Environmental Information
Act.239 The Berlin Administrative Court’s January 2006 order engaged
both federal and EU law, and also referenced guidelines developed by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.240
F. Geography of National Cases
As in the subnational context, the map of the national cases uncovers
complex relationships among place and space. Each of the five nationallevel cases considered here presents a quite different formulation of
parties, but they all have a scalar diversity among their actors that raises
regulatory concerns. Petitioners range from state and city governments to
nongovernmental organizations to individuals. Respondents include state
and national governmental entities, as well as corporations and the
organizations that represent them. These national level fora, with ties to
particular subnational localities, are thus being asked to engage actors
whose geography does not match their own.
All of the national-level cases studied, regardless of subject matter,
follow a similar spatial pattern with respect to their claims. Their facts
contain subnational, national, and supranational dimensions. The resulting
legal claims rely heavily on national-level statutes and cases, and outside
of the U.S. context, on applicable supranational regional law.
The national tribunals, like the subnational courts analyzed in the
preceding part, are thus asked to play a bridging role in these cases. The

238. Id. at 1–2.
239. See id. at 2.
240. For links to the official opinion in German and the unofficial English translation, see Climate
Justice, supra note 232.
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courts face petitioners and respondents connected to subnational and
supranational interests in addition to national ones; these parties notably
include conflicting governmental entities. The facts range across
geographies, and often subnational or supranational law becomes relevant
to the legal analysis before these national-level courts.
VI. MAPPING SUPRANATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
The pending supranational petitions involving the externality of climate
change and its impacts currently focus on international human rights and
protection of world heritage.241 These petitions are being brought by
nongovernmental organizations and individuals with a state as the
respondent, to the extent that there are respondents, but they also involve
underlying corporate behavior. This Part maps the pending petitions and
then analyzes the geography of the supranational actions.
A. International Human Rights: Inuit Petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights
The Inuit petition described in the Introduction242 was brought against
the United States in the Inter-American Commission, which only accepts
petitions against nation-state parties.243 Because energy production and use
provide such a significant portion of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, the
petition’s claims about the inadequacy of U.S. policy necessarily include
its approach to regulating energy.244 The petition can thus be seen as an
effort to force national policy, at both an executive and legislative level,
with respect to climate change generally and to greenhouse gas emissions
from the energy industry in particular.

241. Future actions to address climate change may also include claims regarding marine pollution
in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and claims regarding illegal subsidies in the World
Trade Organization. See ASIL 2006 Annual Meeting Proposal, Climate Justice: Unpacking
Transnational and International Litigation (on file with author).
242. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
243. The phenomenon represented in the Inuit case of using human rights actions against state
parties to induce governmental regulation of corporate actors is not confined to the climate change
context. My interest in the state-corporate regulatory dynamic arose due to a prior project I completed
on environmental rights. In the thirteen environmental rights actions in international and regional
tribunals I considered in that study, which also analyzed cases in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, all of the cases were brought against governments, as “claims were not allowed against
private parties. In ten of the thirteen cases studied, however, a private entity regulated by the
government was the direct cause of the harm, and in another two of those cases [as in the Inuit case
discussed in this Article], corporations appeared to play some role.” Osofsky, supra note 8, at 121–22.
244. See infra notes 250–51 and accompanying text.
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1. Actors
The international human rights action by the Inuit involves multiple
geographies: The chair of a supranational nongovernmental organization
that represents individuals in subnational localities petitioned a
supranational organization against a nation-state. In particular, the
petitioner is Sheila Watt-Cloutier with the support of the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference, a nongovernmental organization representing the
approximately 150,000 Inuit of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia.245
It was brought “on behalf of all Inuit of the Arctic regions of the United
States and Canada,”246 who are peoples that have multiscalar ties at the
levels of their local communities, states, nations, the Artic region, and
international organizations. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference’s Office of
the Chair is located in Iqaluit, Canada,247 and it also has offices in each of
the four countries in which the Inuit live.248 The respondent is the United
States,249 which acknowledges that almost twenty percent of the world’s
human-made greenhouse gases originate from within its borders250 and
projects that its emissions will continue to rise.251 The petition is before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a regional human rights
body that is an organ of the Organization of American States (OAS).252
The Commission members are elected by the OAS General Assembly and
do not represent a particular country.253
2. Claims
The claims in the petition involve facts that cross-cut geographies. The
Inuit present evidence of harm occurring in specific subnational regions of

245. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=16&Lang=
En (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The organization holds Consultative Status II at the United Nations.”
Id.
246. See Inuit Petition, supra note 1, at cover page.
247. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Office of the Chair, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.
php?ID=248&Lang=En (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
248. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 245.
249. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
250. President George W. Bush, Speech Discussing Global Climate Change) (June 11, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html.
251. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002, at 73 (2002),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usnc3.pdf.
252. See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights arts. 2–3, Oct. 31, 1979,
O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), available at http://www.iachr.org/Basicos/basic15.htm; Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, What Is the IACHR?, http://www.iachr.org/what.htm (last visited Apr.
7, 2006).
253. See id.
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four nation-states and argue that this harm results from supranational
climate change, to which the United States is a substantial contributor
through its failure to regulate adequately.254 The petition claims that these
harms violate rights articulated in the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man.255 The Commission interprets the rights in the InterAmerican human rights documents, however, based on broader
international law and developments.256 The Commission thus will apply
regional supranational human rights law, relying in part on other
supranational law, to address facts that have subnational, national, and
supranational elements.
B. World Heritage Preservation: Danger List Petitions to the World
Heritage Committee
In November 2004, nongovernmental organizations and individuals
filed petitions with the World Heritage Committee requesting that Belize’s
Barrier Reef (Belize Petition), Peru’s Huarascán National Park (Peru
Petition), and Nepal’s Sagarmatha (Everest) National Park (Nepal
Petition) be placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, due to the
impacts of climate change.257 They also filed a September 2005 report

254. Inuit Petition, supra note 1.
255. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American system, OEA/Ser. L.V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003). The United States is not
party to the American Convention on Human Rights, see Signatures and Current Status of
Ratifications, American Convention on Human Rights, available at http://www.iachr.org/
Basicos/basic4.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2006), but as a member of the OAS, it is represented by the
Commission and has obligations under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arts. 1–2, supra note 253 (indicating the
rights covered by the Commission and that it represents all OAS members).
256. See, e.g., Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04 OEA/Ser.L./v/II.122, doc. 5 rev. ¶ 86 (2004), available at http://www.
cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm:
According to the jurisprudence of the inter-American human rights system, the provisions of
its governing instruments, including the American Declaration, should be interpreted and
applied in context of developments in the field of international human rights law since those
instruments were first composed and with due regard to other relevant rules of international
law applicable to member states against which complaints of human rights violations are
properly lodged.
257. Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Belize Barrier Reef
Reserve System in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and for
Protective Measures & Actions (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/
UNESCO.petitions.release/belize.barrier.reef.doc [hereinafter Belize Petition]; Petition to the World
Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of the Huascaran National Park in the List of World
Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.
climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release/peru.huascaran.national.park.doc [hereinafter Peru
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with the World Heritage Committee on climate change’s impact on the
Great Barrier Reef in Australia (Australia Report) that details Australia’s
obligations under the World Heritage Convention.258
At its twenty-ninth session, in July 2005, the World Heritage
Committee responded to these petitions and the report by acknowledging
that “the impacts of climate change are affecting many and are likely to
affect many more World Heritage properties, both natural and cultural in
the years to come,” encouraging “all States Parties to seriously consider
the potential impacts of climate change within their management
planning,” and requesting that the World Heritage Centre organize
collaboratively “a broad working group of experts” to prepare a report on
these issues for the thirtieth session.259 In February 2006, organizations
and individuals filed a similar petition regarding Waterton-Glacier
International Peace Park, which is located in both the United States and
Canada.260
If the World Heritage Committee agrees to add sites threatened by
climate change to the Danger List, the sites will be able to access financial
assistance from the World Heritage Fund as well as help with conservation
planning.261 If intended to address the problems fully, however, such
planning would not be able to follow the typical model because the States
Parties concerned include many countries beyond the host country of the
site;262 the nation-state in which the harm is occurring often is not a
substantial contributor to global climate change and thus has little ability

Petition]; Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Sagarmatha National
Park in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and for Protective
Measures & Actions (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.
petitions.release/nepal.sagarmatha.national.park.doc; see U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. World
Heritage Comm., Decisions of the 29th Session of the World Heritage Committee (Durban 2005),
Decision 29 COM 7B.a (Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://whc.unesco.org/ archive/2005/whc0529com-22e.pdf [hereinafter Decision 29 COM 7B.a]; Richard Black, UN Investigates Everest Threat,
BBC NEWS, July 14, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ sci/tech/4682437.stm.
258. DONALD R. ROTHWELL, SYDNEY CTR. FOR INT’L AND GLOBAL LAW, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND THE GREAT BARRIER REEF: AUSTRALIA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WORLD HERITAGE
CONVENTION (Sept. 21, 2004), available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/scigl/SCIGLFinalReport21_
09_04.pdf; see E-mail from Peter Roderick, Co-Director, Climate Justice Programme, to author (Aug.
5. 2005) (on file with author).
259. Decision 29 COM 7B.a, supra note 257.
260. Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Waterton-Glacier
International Peace Park on the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and
for Protective Measures and Actions (Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://law.lclark.edu/org/ielp/
objects/Waterton-GlacierPetition2.15.06.pdf.
261. See World Heritage Centre, supra note 70.
262. Id.
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to address the situation beyond implementing localized mitigating
measures.
Like the planned legal action by the Inuit, the petitions to the World
Heritage Committee are not aimed at the regulation of specific corporate
actors. These petitions, by their nature, are not structured to include a
respondent, though they generally specify who should be involved in
addressing the danger. For example, the petition on the Belize Barrier Reef
includes a request that the Committee assist “the Government of Belize
and Non-Governmental Organizations in developing a program of
immediate corrective measures for the Site.”263 These cases can be viewed,
however, as an effort to put pressure on State Parties to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions, which States likely would achieve in part
through the process of regulating emissions from the production and use of
energy.
1. Actors
The actors in the petitions and report filed in 2004 with the World
Heritage Commission have parallel geographies, each of which represents
a slightly different variation of relevant actors.264 The Belize Petition was
submitted by the Belize Institute of Environmental Law and Policy
(BELPO), a nongovernmental organization incorporated in Belize, based
on an idea presented at the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELaw) 2002 annual meeting. The University of Florida/University of Costa
Rica Joint Program in Environmental Law and its Conservation Clinic
assisted in the construction of the petition, which also was aided by
foundation support to the Joint Program and to E-Law.265 E-Law and the
Climate Justice Programme, based in the United States and United
Kingdom, respectively, advocated in support of the petition.266
The Peru Petition was submitted by two Peruvian nongovernmental
organizations and individuals affiliated with them. Foro Ecologio del Peru
is a national network of nongovernmental organizations and citizens
promoting sustainable development, and Carlos Antonio Martin Soria

263. Belize Petition, supra note 257.
264. The 2006 Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park petition also demonstrates a multiscalar
geography, but is not reviewed in depth here.
265. Belize Petition, supra note 257.
266. See Climate Justice, UNESCO Danger-Listing Petitions Presented (Nov. 17, 2004),
http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release; E-Law, Urge UNESCO to Review
Climate Change Petitions, http://www.elaw.org/campaigns/info.asp?id=2929 (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
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Dall’Orso is a Peruvian environmental lawyer who serves at its legal
advisor.267 Foro Ciudades Para La Vida is a national network of
nongovernmental organizations aiming to implement the principles and
objectives of Habitat II and the Rio Conference, and Architect Liliana
Miranda serves as its executive secretary.268 E-Law and the Climate
Justice Programme also advocated for action on this petition.269
The Nepal Petition was submitted by an even larger group of
nongovernmental organizations and individuals: The Forum for Protection
of Public Interest (Pro Public), a Nepalese nonprofit affiliated with Friends
of the Earth, as well as the Forum’s executive director; two Nepalese
citizens who are accomplished mountaineers; International Public Interest
Defenders, a nongovernmental organization based in Geneva; and a range
of U.S. and European individuals served as the petitioners.270 As with the
other two petitions discussed, E-Law and the Climate Justice Programme
were both involved as proponents.271 The three petitions thus all resulted
from the work of nationally based nongovernmental organizations, with
the assistance of individuals, organizations, universities, and foundations
based in the host countries and in the United States and Europe.
The Australia Report was prepared by the Sydney Centre for
International and Global Law, which is part of the Faculty of Law at the
University of Sydney. The report had been requested by the
Environmental Defender’s Office New South Wales (Ltd),272 CANA,273
and Greenpeace Australia Pacific.274 It thus represents an initiative by

267. Peru Petition, supra note 257.
268. Id.
269. See sources cited supra note 266.
270. See Nepal Petition, supra note 257.
271. See sources cited supra note 266.
272. “The Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices Inc (ANEDO) consists of nine
independently constituted and managed community environmental law centres located in each State
and Territory of Australia.” Environmental Defender’s Offices, National EDO Network,
http://www.edo.org.au/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The Environmental Defender’s Office [(NSW)]
Ltd is a not-for-profit community legal centre specialising in public interest environmental law. We
help the individuals and community groups who are working to protect the natural and built
environment.” Environmental Defender’s Office, EDO New South Wales, http://www.edo.org.au/
edonsw (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
273. For a description of CANA, see supra note 135.
274.
Greenpeace International began in Canada in 1971 and today has a presence in more than 40
countries across Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific.
Greenpeace Australia was founded in 1977 and joined forces with Greenpeace Pacific in
1998. Together we have more than 113,000 supporters who are the backbone of Greenpeace
Australia Pacific.
Greenpeace Australia Pacific, About Greenpeace, http://www.greenpeace.org.au/aboutus (last visited
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nongovernmental organizations operating at a subnational, national, and
supranational level, assisted by a subunit of a subnationally based
university that focuses on supranational issues.
Because of the structure of the petition process, there are no official
respondents in any of the cases. Each petition, however, asks the
Committee to involve the host country of the site, as well as to assist with
both localized and international efforts to address climate change and its
impacts.275 Similarly, although the Australia Report includes a disclaimer
that “[i]t does not purport to provide any advice of a legal character
concerning questions of Australian law” and “should not be relied upon
for the purpose of any legal process or proceedings,”276 it analyzes steps
that the Australian government needs to take with respect to climate
change to comply with its obligations under the World Heritage
Convention.277 The petitions and report are thus requesting action with
respect to entities at subnational, national, and supranational levels.
The Committee is an intergovernmental body created by the 1972
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage (World Heritage Convention).278 The Convention dictates that
States Parties, with an equitable representation of regions and cultures,
serve as the members of the Committee.279 The Committee has requested
the establishment of a working group of experts—created collaboratively
by the World Heritage Center, Advisory Bodies, interested States Parties,
and petitioners—to address the risks posed by global climate change to
World Heritage sites and to propose a management strategy.280 The
decision-makers are thus nation-states acting within a supranational
structure and being advised by expert individuals from around the world.

Apr. 7, 2006) (emphasis omitted). The Australia Office of Greenpeace is based in Sydney, and the
Pacific Office is based in the Fiji Islands. Greenpeace Australia Pacific, Contact Us, http://www.
greenpeace.org.au/aboutus/contact_us.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). Other branches of Greenpeace
have also been involved in climate change litigation. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
275. Belize Petition, supra note 257; Nepal Petition, supra note 257; Peru Petition, supra note
257.
276. Australia Report, supra note 258, at 39.
277. Id. at 14–38.
278. Articles 8–14 describe the Committee in detail. Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage arts. 8–14, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151,
available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf [hereinafter World Heritage
Convention].
279. Id. art. 8.
280. Decision 29 COM 7B.a, supra note 257.
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2. Claims
The factual and legal claims in the petitions and report to the World
Heritage Committee are geographically similar both to one another and to
the ones in the Inuit case. The facts in each submission detail harm to a
subnational resource, regulated by a State Party, which has been
designated by a supranational body as belonging “to all the peoples of the
world, irrespective of the territory on which they are located.”281 Each
petition claims that supranational climate change is endangering the sites
sufficiently to include them on a supranational danger list and to require
steps to address the problem.282 The applicable law is the supranational
World Heritage Convention.283 The claims thus involve the application of
an international regulatory regime to multilevel facts.
C. Geography of Supranational Cases
Although the map of supranational cases reflects a similar spatial
diversity to the subnational and national ones, the specific issues faced by
the tribunals as a result are reversed. Namely, the supranational tribunals
have a transnational perspective on the cross-cutting actors, facts, and
claims, but must engage the subnational and national dimensions of them
through governmental and nongovernmental entities at those levels.
The space created by the tribunals, and in particular the limited
standing they provide for non-state actors, further shapes the geographic
picture. Even tribunals such as the ones considering the above petitions,
which allow for petitions from non-state actors, only allow the actions to
be brought against the nation-states which are parties to the treaties that
constitute them.284 Moreover, beyond the general issues of the
enforceability of international judgments that lack the state’s police
powers behind them, many of the relevant tribunals have not been granted
the power to provide binding judgments.285

281. World Heritage Centre, About World Heritage, http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2006). See World Heritage Center, World Heritage List, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last
visited Apr. 7, 2006).
282. See Belize Petition, supra note 257; Nepal Petition, supra note 257; Peru Petition, supra note
257. See also Australia Report, supra note 258, at 1–6.
283. See World Heritage Convention, supra note 278, arts. 8–14.
284. See Osofsky, supra note 8, at 100 n.122 (citing provisions of several human rights
conventions that provide this limitation).
285. For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has limited direct
enforcement powers. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
arts. 41–51, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.iachr.org/
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The geography of supranational climate change actions thus varies
significantly from that of subnational and national ones. Although
supranational actions aim at the same type of problems as the subnational
and national cases, they generally involve individuals and
nongovernmental organizations making claims against nation-states for a
failure to regulate. This spatial structure—and the tribunals’ reliance on
national-level and sometimes subnational-level regulatory power—shapes
the possibilities for influence of actions on this level.
VII. TOWARDS A REGULATORY MODEL
The above maps provide insight into the existing regulatory terrain.
Except in the case in which corporate entities and representatives attempt
to limit regulation,286 the climate change litigation studied represents an
effort to fill perceived regulatory gaps. The lawsuits provide a mechanism
for many of the interested parties to engage regulatory questions more
directly than legislative or executive decision-making processes generally
allow. They also provide a space in which actors operating at different
levels and from different branches can dialogue together.287
The flexibility and variety of judicial fora, however, also constrains the
role of this litigation. The geography detailed in Parts IV through VI
places decision-makers in the position of needing to make appropriate
judgments in the same three-dimensional morass that confronts other
actors.288 The complexity of these actions, combined with their novelty,
creates a potential for confusion that adds to uncertainty over whether this
type of litigation can serve as an effective regulatory tool.
More fundamentally, this geography raises questions about whether
regulatory gap-filling is the most useful way of viewing these efforts, and
if so, how else these regulatory gaps might possibly be filled. The
transnational treaty regime on climate change does not include the most
significant greenhouse gas contributor—the United States—as a party to
its more specific limitations.289 And even the agreement that provides
those limitations, the Kyoto Protocol, has been criticized as insufficient.290
Moreover, lawyers and policy-makers are still grappling with how to

Basicos/basic3.htm (describing the functions of the Commission).
286. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
287. See supra Parts IV–VI.
288. See id.
289. See Bush, supra note 250.
290. See, e.g., Martin Parry et al., Buenos Aires and Kyoto Targets Do Little to Reduce Climate
Change Impacts, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 285 (1998) (criticizing the targets as insufficient).
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translate a belief that climate change needs to be addressed into effective
regulatory approaches. The most ambitious implementation measures at
national and subnational levels often fail to meet their emissions reduction
goals despite well-organized and focused efforts.291
An engagement of these questions allows a necessary conceptual shift
from describing the existing terrain to engaging its normative implications.
This Part begins an exploration of these issues as a jumping off point for a
companion article that sketches a proposed law and geography approach to
transnational regulation of cross-cutting environmental problems like
climate change. In particular, the geographic terrain represented by climate
change litigation invites a normative inquiry into identity questions. At the
most basic level, this terrain reframes how the litigation might be viewed,
or in geographic terms, raises issues about the space the litigation should
be viewed as occupying. An exploration of that space paves the way for a
dialogue about other spaces underlying it, such as those occupied by core
actors. Such an analysis also provides the basis for engaging the cultural
discourse underlying those spaces.
A. Transnational Litigative Spaces
The literature at the intersection of international law and international
relations regarding the process of making and enforcing transnational law
provides multiple conceptions of the space that litigation occupies within
it. For example, a scholar relying on a transnational judicial process
approach would likely view climate change litigation as part of the vertical
process through which “interaction, interpretation, and internalization”
promote obedience to law.292 A transgovernmentalist might focus in on
this litigation as an instance of nascent judicial globalization; although
these tribunals do not directly interact, they collectively become part of the
transgovernmental networks that undergird disaggregated sovereign
discourse.293

291. For example, despite Portland’s ambitious emissions reduction plan and per capita successes,
its population growth has led to overall increases in emissions. See CITY OF PORTLAND &
MULTNOMAH COUNTY, LOCAL ACTION PLAN ON GLOBAL W ARMING (2001), available at
http://www.sustainableportland.org/Portland%20Global%20Warming%20Plan.pdf; CITY OF
PORTLAND, PORTLAND CLIMATE CHANGE EFFORTS (2003), available at http://www.sustainable
portland.org/stp_Ptld_climate_sum_2003.pd; City of Portland Office of Sustainable Development,
Sustainable Technologies and Practices, http://www.sustainableportland.org/stp_glo_home.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2006).
292. Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After
September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004).
293. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (describing this
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A law and geography approach to understanding the value and
potential role of climate change litigation uses the ties to place and
underlying spatial constructs—and their evolution over time—as a starting
point for the normative inquiry.294 Choosing a framing—whether
transnational judicial process, transgovernmentalism, or an alternative
theoretical approach—defines the conceptual space this litigation occupies
and, as a result, suggests how it should be valued. This process must
originate from an understanding of ties to place and how that space
engages them.
The normative inquiry about climate change litigation as part of the
process of transnational regulation would be thickened by exploring how a
spatial model represented by a theoretical approach might map onto the
geographic terrain represented and vice versa. Such an approach would
engage the overlaps and disconnects among different approaches to
litigative spaces, as well as questions of how this litigation should be
viewed in the broader scheme of transnational regulatory governance. The
insights from geography thus provide a framework for comparing existing
theoretical approaches as defining narratives for climate change litigation.
B. Key Actors and Litigative Spaces
A disaggregation of the first inquiry leads the way to a second cluster
of issues revolving around the actors that participate in climate change
litigation. The actors’ geography reflects that they all have layered,
evolving identities, and that this litigation provides a forum for a
multifaceted interchange. Moreover, the petitioners, respondents, and
adjudicators each occupy different—and often multiple—spaces on the
interrelated axes of power described in Part III.B.
The interchanges among key actors about multiscalar issues help to
define how climate change litigation should be viewed. To the extent that
there is a dynamic cycle among the actors and the process of litigation, an
inquiry into the space this litigation should occupy helps to define our
construction of the actors, which in terms helps to redefine the space. This
nuanced dance, for example, forms a core part of the story that both
transnational legal process and transgovernmentalism tell.295

process in contexts of direct interaction); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role
of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487,
497–99 (2005).
294. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
295. See sources cited supra notes 27, 292–93.
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Because those actors have ties to specific places that form a key part of
who they are, a geographic understanding of transnational litigation
provides a more specific account of its role. The actors connect through
webs of space, place, and time, with climate change litigation serving as
one mode of interaction among them. A focus on a geopolitical conception
of the actors thus allows a more complete conception of the space that the
litigation occupies.
C. Identity and Culture
With this inquiry into the spaces that litigation and its key actors should
be viewed as occupying, questions of culture and identity emerge. The
Inuit on whose behalf the Inter-American petition was filed, for example,
are simultaneously members of indigenous peoples connected to specific
localities with long-standing cultural traditions, citizens under multiple
levels and forms of government, and members of a broader supranational
organization representing interconnected indigenous peoples.296 Each of
these identities is place-specific, but also locates the Inuit petitioners in
multiple cultural dialogues. A definition of the spaces those petitioners and
that petition occupy would be incomplete if not informed by that cultural
content, which includes exploring cultural dissent embodied in the framing
of and interaction through the petition process.297
Geography provides a theoretical terrain which helps to integrate the
first two inquiries with this third piece. Cultural geographers, for example,
engage the implications of the dynamics between local and global for “the
relationships between identity, meaning and place.”298 A law and
geography lens thus allows for dynamics among place, space, time,
culture, identity, and law to interweave with the geopolitical analysis of
the litigation and its actors.

296. For an analysis of the relationship, for example, between citizenship and identity, see Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); Leti Volpp, “Obnoxious to Their
Very Nature”: Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71 (2001).
297. For an exploration of a cultural-dissent approach to cultural conflict and its relationship to
law, see Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN L. REV. 495 (2001); see also Madhavi Sunder,
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (analyzing the interaction of law and culture in the
context of women’s human rights activists who work in Muslim communities and countries).
298. Linda McDowell, The Transformation of Cultural Geography, in HUMAN GEOGRAPHY:
SOCIETY, SPACE, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 146, 166 (Derek Gregory, Ron Martin, and Graham Smith
eds. 1994).
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VIII. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The complicated problems of regulating the transnational energy
industry represent a significant departure from the primacy of state power
at the time of the Treaty of Westphalia. Mapping climate change litigation
provides a window into the power dynamics that influence the current
regulatory process. Examining the whirling dervish of interested entities
highlights the complexity of addressing these externalities, but it also
provides a path for making progress.
Despite the three-dimensional morass the spatial analysis unveils,
much of the fundamental framework of state sovereignty and equality
remains and can help shape a modern approach to effective transnational
environmental regulation. In their legislative, executive, and judicial
capacities, governmental actors are playing a critical role in shaping a
transnational regulatory process and dancing between domestic and
international law.299 An understanding of the multidimensional,
intertwined relationships allows for more targeted, effective approaches to
such litigation and broader questions of corporate responsibility.
Achieving effective regulation rests on the ability to create strategies
that incorporate the multiple dimensions involved. Such strategies must
rely upon governmental power, but a thick version of this power that
views the nation-state in context. As Part VII suggests, this Article’s
descriptive analysis provides a context for a normative law and geography
exploration of climate change litigation, its core actors, and issues of
identity and culture. The interweaving of international law, international
relations, and geography allows an engagement of this type of litigation as
part of a broader dialogue about transnational regulatory approaches. The
companion article that follows this one will build upon this piece’s
analysis to explore these issues.

299. Scholarly debate continues over how much of the framework remains. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 82. The key role of nation-states in this litigation suggests that a workable model of
transnational regulation must engage a thick version of nation-state regulatory authority, a version I
plan to explore in more depth in the companion piece.

